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A form.er Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission
once stated that people in the securities industry could be reasonably sure
they would not get into trouble with the Commission so long as they did
what most of them agreed was the decent and honorable thing to do.1 The
recent Report of Special Study of Securities Markets2 has demonstrated
that, although there is presently no widespread pattern of fraud, in many
instances those in the securities industry do not act in a decent and honorable manner. Thus, while the fundamental structure of the securities
market is sound, and the basic regulatory patterns of the securities acts can
be said to require no fundamental reconstruction, the present shortcomings
must be analyzed and ultimately remedied if the securities market is to
operate at an optimum level of efficiency and integrity. The acquisition of
capital from the general public is so important to national economic growth
that a securities market which operates at anything less than an optimum
level cannot be tolerated. Therefore, it is essential that acts and practices
which undermine public confidence in the securities market and harm the
investors who furnish the funds necessary to adequate economic progress
be eliminated. This comment analyzes four areas of central significance to adequate protection for the investor: (1) qualifications of those in the securities
industry who deal with the public; (2) dissemination of corporate publicity;
(3) dissemination of investment advice; and (4) selling practices in the
securities industry. The findings and recommendations of the Special Study
are given special attention insofar as they bear upon the problems covered.
In certain areas, however, recent developments in court and Commission
decisions have brought about changes equally as significant as the findings
and recommendations of the Special Study. Thus each section covers the
background and recent developments in the designated area, as well as the
Special Study itself.
1 These are the words of the late Judge Healy, quoted in Loss, The SEC and the
Broker-Dealer, I VAND. L. REv. 516 (1948).
2 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (hereinafter cited as Special Study].
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QUALIFICATIONS OF SECURITIES PERSONNEL DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC

The quality of personnel in the securities industry is highly significant
in determining the impact of the industry upon the public. Securities personnel who deal with the public are in a key position, for the buying
public must depend upon the ability and integrity of such personnel in
obtaining access to the securities markets. The most important factor influencing the quality of personnel is the qualifications required for
entering and remaining in the industry. Yet the present scheme of securities
regulation does not impose sufficently high standards in this regard. This
is amply demonstrated by a brief survey of the relevant agencies controlling
industry qualifications.
The Securities and Exchange Commission exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the entire regulatory structure of the exchanges and the over-thecounter markets under the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.4 The philosophy behind these acts is simply
that anyone should be able to enter the securities field unless barred by
specific acts of misconduct. Thus no standards relating to knowledge,
training, or experience in the securities business are imposed at the federal
level. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and the regional exchanges have generally adequate qualification
standards for personnel of member firms. The selective basis of exchange
membership, however, denies the public protection from the abuses that
are widespread in other segments of the securities industry. The National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the self-regulatory association
which polices the over-the-counter market, has prescribed examination and
character requirements, but not training standards. While the overwhelming majority of over-the-counter brokerage firms which deal with the public
are members of the NASD, there are significant sectors of the securities
industry which do not belong to the NASD. State Blue Sky laws constitute
the only source of restrictions on entry into the industry for the remaining
brokers and dealers, and even in those states which have established qualification standards, the strictness of the controls and the quality of their
administration vary widely.
As will be seen below,5 a high percentage of violations of Commission,
exchange, and self-regulatory association rules are attributable to personnel
with inadequate experience in the industry, and to firms with insufficient
capitalization. This suggests that there is a relationship between the factors
of experience, technical competence, and financial stability and those of
integrity and business reliability. Thus the imposition of higher qualificas 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963).
54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963).
For a study of background of the provisions of these acts, see Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1931 and the Jm,estment Advisers Act of 1910, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214
(1959).
IS See notes 24 & 35 infra.
4
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tion standards might well have the effect of raising ethical standards and
practices as well as technical competence itself.
It will be the purpose of this section to analyze the present state of
qualification standards in the securities industry, to examine the major
defects in the regulatory structure, and to evaluate the solutions proposed
by the Securities and Exchange Commission6 and by the Special Study of
Securities Markets.7

A. Securities Personnel Who Deal With the Public
There are several categories of persons in the securities industry who
deal with the public.8 The broker is an agent of a private investor and
handles the latter's order to buy or sell securities. For this service, a commission is charged. Section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 act9 defines a broker as one
who engages in the business of performing securities transactions for the
account of others. In contrast, a dealer acts as a principal by buying
securities for his own account and subsequently selling to customers from
his own inventory.10 The dealer's profit is determined by the difference
between the price he pays and the price he receives for the same security.
Section 3(a)(5) of the 1934 act11 defines a dealer as one who buys and sells
securities for his own account as part of a regular business. A dealer should
be sharply differentiated from a trader. A trader is a private investor who
regularly buys and sells securities for his own account but does not handle
other persons' securities or money. Typically, broker-dealers are owners or
principals of securities firms-either individual proprietors, partners, or
officers. On the major exchanges, members act primarily as brokers for the
public-buyers or sellers of listed stocks; approximately seventy-five percent
of the total round-lot share volume on such exchanges consists of agency
transactions for customers.12 Exchange rules limit the ability of members
to deal with listed securities for their own accounts. For example, Rule 92
of the New York Stock Exchange provides that no member shall buy or
initiate the purchase of any security for his own account or for any account
in which he or his member organization is directly or indirectly interested
6 The Securities Exchange Commission has presented to Congress legislative proposals
for amendment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963). H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963). These proposals are based on the recommendations of the Special Study.
See also H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The Securities Exchange Commission is
herein referred to as the SEC or the Commission.
1 Special Study pt. 1, at iii-ix.
s The scope of this section is limited to personnel in the securities industry who deal
with the public. For instance, the specialist on an exchange, who usually deals only with
members on the exchange floor, is not included. Investment advisers are given attention
here only incidentally; regulation of investment advisers is considered in detail in section
III infra.
9 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1958).
10 For a more comprehensive treatment of the distinction between brokers and dealers,
see section IV infra.
11 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1958).
12 special Study pt. 2, at 9.
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while the member has knowledge that his organization holds an unexecuted
market order to buy the security in the unit of trading for the customer.is
In the over-the-counter market, however, a firm or individual may combine
the functions of broker and dealer, acting in one capacity or the other,
depending upon the circumstances. Thus, an exchange firm which participates in the over-the-counter market may decide to trade unlisted stock on
a principal rather than an agency basis. 14
Other functional roles are present. One or more may be performed by
any given person. The supervisor, as the head of the branch office of a
broker-dealer firm, may have influence and responsibility similar to that of
the firm's owners. The salesman, who is employed by a broker-dealer firm
to execute securities transactions for and with the public, has the most
frequent personal contact with the public. From the standpoint of the
public, however, the most important person in the industry is often the
investment adviser, who is responsible for recommending that the customer
buy or sell particular stocks. Investment advisers include every person who
engages in the business of furnishing investment advice for a fee, either by
managing investors' portfolios, or by publishing a subscription service, or
both. 111 In some firms, salesmen or the broker-dealer principal himself may
make investment recommendations. While some broker-dealers are registered investment advisers,16 an investment adviser as defined in section
2(1 I) of the Investment Advisers Act of 194017 does not include any broker
or dealer whose performance of such service is solely incidental to his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation for his
advice. Many firms employ analysts, who base their investment advice on
research. In such a case, the salesman acts as a conduit in the dissemination
of investment advice. The investor may also engage the services of an independent investment adviser, using the broker-dealer firm only to perform
the actual transaction. The dissemination of investment advice is given more
attention in section III infra.
B. Regulation of Securities Personnel
I. Federal Controls
Broker-dealer firms effecting any transaction in the over-the-counter
market, except those whose business is exclusively intrastate, must register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 15(b) of the
NYSE Rule 92.
A relatively small but increasing percentage of listed stock is traded in the overthe-counter market by firms not members of an exchange. Also, some issuers choose not
to list their stocks even though the security would satisfy exchange trading standards. See
Special Study pt. 1, at 14.
111 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 2(11), 54 Stat. 848, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-2(a)(ll) (1958).
10 As of June 30, 1962, 1836 investment advisers were registered with the Commission.
Those broker-dealers which are registered investment advisers primarily engage in the
brokerage business. Special Study pt. 1, at 19.
17 54 Stat. 848 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll)(c) (1958).
13
H
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1934 Act.18 The securities industry includes a small group of large brokerdealer firms which employ numerous salesmen and supervisors at numerous
branch offices; they hold a dominant share of the public business. This
group consists primarily of large firms which do a general business on both
the exchanges and the over-the-counter markets, firms which are members
of the NASD and one or more exchanges, and large mutual fund sales organizations-not members of any exchange and sometimes not even members of the NASD. On the other hand, there are many small firms in the
securities industry; they have, a less substantial but still significant share of
the public business. In fact, the vast majority of registered broker-dealers
have only one office. Of the nearly 6,000 broker-dealers registered with the
Commission on June 30, 1962, thirty percent were sole proprietorships.19
The standards for denial of registration of a firm by the Commission
under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act20 relate primarily to specified past acts of
misconduct. These statutory disqualifications include the filing of a false or
misleading statement in the application for registration, a conviction
within the ten years preceding for a felony or misdemeanor concerning
securities, an injunction by a federal or state court against conduct involving securities, and willful violation of the Securities Act of 1933,21 the
1934 Act, or any of the rules and regulations of the Commission. In addition,
the Commission must find that denial or revocation of the registration of
a broker-dealer firm is in the public interest. In applying for registration, a
firm must complete application form BD and list whether any of its personnel are subject to any of the statutory disqualifications. The Commission
may deny or revoke the registration of a firm upon a finding that the
broker-dealer principal, partner, director, officer, branch office manager, or
"any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled" by the brokerdealer has committed one of the proscribed acts of misconduct.22
Section 15(b) does not establish standards of competence as to knowledge, training, and experience in the securities business for the firm's personnel as a prerequisite to the firm's registration. Factual findings of the
Special Study demonstrate the high number of inexperienced principals in
newly registered broker-dealer firms. For example, of the 210 firms which
registered with the Commission during the first three months of 1961, 58,
48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958).
Special Study pt. 1, at 16.
49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958). On the denial and
revocation of registration of broker-dealer firms, see 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1301-58 (1961), and cases therein cited [hereinafter cited as Loss].
21 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963).
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b), 49 Stat. 1377, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b) (1958). A brokerage firm, therefore, can be registered only if none of its personnel are subject to any of the statutory disqualifications. The Commission has taken
the position that an employee of a broker-dealer is a controlled person within the
meaning of § 15(b) of the 1934 Act. See 2 Loss 1314-23. However, the Commission frequently consents to the hiring of a person subject to a revocation order upon condition
that he be appropriately supervised and not be given any managerial responsibility.
See 2 Loss 1329-30.
18
10
20
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or 28 percent, did not have experienced persons as principals, and over
half the firms had principals with less than two years experience.23 Generally, the most recently registered securities firms-especially those with
inexperienced principals-have been responsible for a heavy preponderance
of the more severe disciplinary penalties assessed by the NASD. In addition,
such firms have frequently violated the net capital rule of the Commission
and have often engaged in underwriting speculative stock issues.24
Investment advisers25 must register with the Commission under section
203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.26 Any one of a similar group of
specific acts of misconduct constitutes statutory disqualification,27 but no
positive standards of competence or integrity are prescribed for investment
advisers at the federal level. Newly registered investment adviser firms,
like new broker-dealers, exhibit a high number of inexperienced principals.
During a three-month period in 1961, 79 firms, with a total of 141 principals,
registered with the Commission. Eighty-nine principals, or 63 percent, had
no prior experience in the securities business. 28
Section 15(b)(D) of the Exchange Act, which deals with willful violations
of the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act, or any of the rules and regulations by
the Commission promulgated pursuant to these acts,2 9 is utilized by the
Commission when it seeks to revoke the registration of a securities firm. In
order to determine whether brokerage firms are in compliance with section
15(b)(D), the Commission undertakes periodic examinations of brokerdealer firms through its regional offices. A typical full-scale examination of a
brokerage firm determines its financial condition, its selling practices, its
treatment of customers' funds and securities, and its compliance with the
credit regulations of the Federal Reserve Board30 and the bookkeeping and
financial report rules of the Commission.31
Section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act32 gives the Commission authority
to promulgate rules with respect to financial responsibility of broker-dealer
firms in order to protect investors. Thus the Commission has adopted
Rule 15c3-l,33 which prescribes that no broker or dealer shall permit his
aggregate indebtedness to exceed an amount equal to twenty times his net
capital. The Special Study found that low capital firms have a much
Special Study pt. I, at 65. See also 23 SEC ANN. REP. 78 (1957).
Special Study pt. 1, at 66-67.
On the regulation of investment advisers generally, see section III infra.
54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (Supp. IV, 1963).
Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
2s special Study pt. 1, at 146.
20 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(D), 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(D) 1958).
so See Comment, Civil Remedies Based Upon Illegal Extension of Credit in Violation
of Regulation T, 61 MICH. L. REv. 940 (1963).
Sl On the inspection procedures of the Commission, see 20 SEC ANN. REP. 43 (1954);
22 SEC ANN. REP. 112 (1956); 25 SEC ANN. REP. 107 (1959).
82 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1958).
88 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l (Cum. Supp. 1963).
23
24
25
20
27
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greater chance of falling into net capital difficulties than firms with higher
capital. For example, 210 of the 220 broker-dealers whose reports indicated violation of the Commission's capital rule ratio had net capital of less
than 5,000 dollars. 84 Moreover, low capital firms have been involved in a
high proportion of the Commission's revocation actions and have engaged
excessively in the underwriting of "unseasoned," speculative stock issues.35
Neither the Commission nor the NASD imposes minimum capital requirements upon securities firms. It would appear that the net capital rule, as it
presently stands, does not by itself insure the sound financial status for
brokerage firms which is necessary to protect the public.

2. NASD Regulation
Section 15A of the Exchange Act36 authorizes the registration of national securities associations to provide self-regulation in the over-thecounter market similar to that provided by the exchanges in the exchange
markets. At the present time, the NASD is the only registered national securities association.37 The NASD rules allow member firms to grant discounts
on prices or commission rates only to member firms. 38 Thus a member firm
must deal with each nonmember firm on the same terms and conditions as
it deals with the general public. Membership in the NASD is an economic
necessity if one is to engage profitably in almost any phase of underwriting
and most over-the-counter business. The overwhelming majority of securities firms doing business in the over-the-counter market, including member
firms of the exchanges, have therefore joined the NASD. The Special Study
covered 4,964 over-the-counter firms and found that 4,417 were members of
the NASD. 89 Nevertheless, there remain many firms not members of the
NASD, including firms whose business is limited to the exchanges; certain
mutual fund, real estate security, and investment adviser firms; and put and
call dealers.
The NASD by-laws bar from membership any broker or dealer who
has been subject to (1) a suspension or expulsion order by an exchange or
association for unjust and inequitable conduct, (2) a denial or revocation
of registration order by the Commission, (3) an order of suspension or
expulsion from membership in an exchange or association, entered by the
Commission, or (4) a conviction within the ten years preceding for a felony
or misdemeanor involving fraud. 40 These exclusions apply not only to the
34

special Study pt. 1, at 91.

35 Id. at 91-92.
86 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (1958). The essential purpose of the
Maloney Act of 1938, which added § 15A to the Exchange Act, was to provide for
a self-regulatory association in the over-the-counter market. See 2 Loss 1359-64.
37 On the NASD, see generally Cherrington, National Association of Securities
Dealers, 27 HARV. Bus. REY. 741 (1949); White, National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 28 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 250 (1959).
38 NASD RULES OF FAm PRACTICE art. III, § 25.
39 Special Study pt. 1, at 16.
40 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(a); see 22 SEC ANN. REP. 117 (1956). The Exchange Act
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broker-dealer principal, but also to any partner, officer, director, branch
office manager, or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled
by the broker-dealer.41 Thus, to become a member of the NASD, a brokerdealer principal must show that all of its personnel are free of such disqualifications.42 To enforce compliance with its by-laws and rules of fair
practice, the NASD has its own inspection program and a well organized
disciplinary procedure.43
Prior to 1955, the NASD required no standards as to experience and
knowledge of the securities business. In that year, however, the NASD
amended its by-laws and restricted admission to those firms whose proprietors, partners, officers, and other persons controlling the firm had had
one year's experience in the securities business or had passed a written
examination.44 The new by-laws also prohibited member firms from employing salesmen who had neither had one year's experience in the securities business nor had passed a written examination for registered representatives.45 At first, the NASD gave the same relatively easy examination
to all classes of inexperienced personnel, such as proprietors, branch office
managers, and salesmen. Recently, however, the NASD has taken steps
to increase the breadth and difficulty of its written examination for salesmen. 46 The use of an examination as the primary test of the competence
of a securities salesman is highly advisable in view of the diverse occupational backgrounds and educational levels of applicants seeking to become
registered representatives. 47
provides that association rules must make an over-the-counter broker or dealer eligible
for membership unless he has been guilty of specific violations of securities laws or exchange or association rules. The act, however, allows the association to restrict membership geographically, or by the type of business of the members, or on such other specified
and appropriate basis as appears to the Commission to be necessary or appropriate for
the protection of investors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15A(b)(3) &: (4), 52 Stat.
1070 (1938). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(3) &: (4) (1958).
NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(a), art. XV, § 3(b).
The Commission must approve the registration of a salesman whose record shows
a prior revocation by the NASD, the SEC, or an exchange. See NASD, THE NASD
AND THE REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE 40-41 (1961). See also 2 Loss 1381-87.
43 See 2 id. at 1371-74; see White, supra note 37, at 256-58. See also MAYER, WALL
STREET: MEN AND MONEY 230-32 (1955).
44 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(b); see 22 SEC ANN. REP. 119 (1956).
45 NASD BY-LAWS art. I, § 2(b). Registered representative includes every employee of
a member firm engaged in the managing, supervising, solicitating, trading, handling, and
selling of listed or unlisted securities. NASD BY-LAWS art. XV, § I.
46 Since 1961, the NASD has given qualifying examinations. In 1961, 3% of the
30,790 examinations scored resulted in failure; in 1962, the failure rate was 14% of
16,186 examinations. Since November 1962, with an increased passing grade, one-third
of those taking the examination have failed to achieve a passing score. Special Study pt.
1, at 120. It should be noted that since July 1, 1963 a single combined examination has
been given for salesmen employed by members of the NASD and the New York and
American Stock Exchanges. Two hours are devoted to general securities subjects and
NASD problems. The third hour deals with exchange problems of a more complex
nature. Ibid.
47 A 1961 NASD survey revealed that 99% of the newly registered representatives
attended high school and 68% spent some time at college. Id. at 96. A 1960 NASD survey
41
42
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The NASD has recently taken the position that principals and supervisors should have a greater degree of knowledge of the securities business
than that of salesmen. Consequently, the Board of Governors of the NASD
in 1962 authorized the development of a separate three-hour written examination for all proprietors, partners, and officers of member firms who lack
one year's experience in the securities industry. A new type of examination for principals and branch office managers, including material on
supervisory responsibility, was initiated on December 1, 1963. The Special
Study reported that most general securities firms require a supervisor to
have three years experience in the securities business, although some may
require as little as one year. Low-capital firms and certain mutual fund firms,
however, often have supervisors with no experience and limited education.48
The NASD does not make an independent determination of the in,
tegrity of an applicant for a position as a salesman. However, it does
require that a member who employs a registered representative have reason
to believe that the person is of good character and business repute. A responsible partner, officer, director, or branch office manager must sign a
certification to this effect after a reasonably diligent investigation of the
applicant's background.49 If the member firm is not sufficiently industrious in searching for unfavorable aspects of a candidate's past history,
it may be subjected to disciplinary action by the NASD.
Since the NASD entrance requirements concerning competence and
integrity are directed at personnel who are engaged in the managing,
supervising, trading, and selling of listed and unlisted securities, an analyst
who participates solely in research activities for the brokerage firm need
not comply with these qualifications. Furthermore, the New York Stock
Exchange does not impose on analysts separate entrance requirements pertaining to research and evaluation of securities. Nevertheless, the Special
Study found that the level of educational background of those engaged in
research is unusually high. The great majority hold a college degree, and
a considerable number have undertaken graduate studies in different
fields. Moreover, some firms have training programs for analysts, and
others hire only experienced analysts. Some firms, however, still allow
inexperienced analysts with minimal training or supervision to make investment recommendations to the public.rm
The NASD, by tightening its examination and character requirements,
showed that 47% of the salesmen came from professional categories, such as accountants,
teachers, engineers, and lawyers, and from relatively skilled occupations in a supervisory
capacity. On the other hand, 19% came from a heterogeneous group of occupations.
Id at 95. Furthermore, the Special Study found that about 50% of the firms covered in
the survey bad no particular educational prerequisites for prospective salesmen, and
75% of the firms had no requirements of previous experience in the securities industry.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 136.
NASD RuLES OF FAIR PRACTICE art. III, § 27(c); see Matters of Vickers, Christy
&: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6872, August 8, 1962.
50 special Study pt. 1, at 145.
48

49
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is seeking to bring better qualified personnel into the over-the-counter
firms. The effort of the NASD to raise its qualification standards is deficient
in one major respect: it does not require a minimum training period for
registered representatives and does not examine or approve the training
programs of its members. However, the NASD has recently prepared a
training guide for use by member firms in their training program.
The Special Study found that training programs of firms not members
of the major exchanges typically involve some on-the-job training, supplemented by lecturing or tutoring sessions. In addition, the Report noted
that mutual fund firms tend to devote substantially fewer hours to on-thejob training than general securities firms. Even so, over half the firms not
specializing in mutual funds give no on-the-job training at all.'51 Furthermore, the Special Study indicated that a substantial number of NASD
firms give no more training than is required to pass the written examination and become familiar with the type of securities in which the particular
brokerage firm specializes.52 Thus, it would appear that a major weakness
of training programs of firms in the over-the-counter market is the tendency
to overemphasize the business of the particular firm, leaving registered
representatives lacking in over-all knowledge of the securities industry. To
remedy these deficiencies, a proper training program should accomplish
two primary objectives. First, all securities salesmen should be given more
comprehensive instruction in all aspects of the securities business. Second,
all personnel should be taught the importance of developing professional
responsibility in the firm-client relationship.

3. Exchange Regulation
Upon registration as a national securities exchange under section 6 of
the 1934 Act, 53 an exchange must establish membership rules which are
just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors.54 The
New York Stock Exchange requires that an applicant for membership or
allied membership serve six months as a trainee in a member firm if he
proposes to do business with the public and lacks previous experience in
the securities business.55 The Midwest and American Stock Exchanges
Id. at Ill.
Id. at HO.
5S 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f) (1958).
II¼ Securites Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(d), 48 Stat. 886, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1958). The
Commission has supervisory authority over exchange affairs. Under § 19(b) of the 1934
Act, it may amend the rules of the exchanges with respect to the financial responsibility
of the members and similar matters when the exchanges fail to act after appropriate
notice. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1958). Moreover, the SEC, under § 19(a) of
the 1934 Act, has the power to withdraw the registration of a national securities exchange.
48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(l) (1958). On exchange regulation, see generally 2
Loss 1149-1276.
55 NYSE RULE 301.12. Only individuals can hold seats or be members of the exchange.
NYSE CONSTITUTION art. IX, §§ 1-2. The upper limit on Exchange membership is 1,374.
As of June 30, 1962, the membership of the NYSE was 1,366. This figure included 1,011
individuals affiliated with 672 firms. About 500 NYSE firms do business with the public.
51
52
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impose six-month training periods upon prospective members and allied
members.56 Under Rule 342 of the NYSE, a member firm must secure the
approval of the Exchange for its choice of a branch office manager as a
new supervisor in either an existing office or a new regional office.57 The
Special Study found that large New York Stock Exchange member firms
seldom appoint personnel with less than ten years experience to positions
of supervisory responsibility.58
Any candidate for the position of registered representative in the NYSE
-which includes all employees engaged in soliciting, trading, handling,
and selling listed and unlisted securities59-must undergo a six-month
training period if he has had no previous experience in the securities industry. 60 Each salesman-trainee is expected to undertake on-the-job training supplemented by organized study. The Special Study determined that
a dozen large member firms have organized classroom training in such
depth that it might be called a school.61 For example, Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., in its model training program, requires all its
trainees to spend fourteen weeks of intensive classroom training at the
New York City home office. A total of 420 classroom hours are spent on
a broad range of securities subjects. However, since the cost of intensive
classroom training is very high, most NYSE firms, both large and small,
merely combine on-the-job training with courses taken by correspondence
or at local universities. 62 A salesman-trainee who performs his on-the-job
training at the home office of a member firm in a metropolitan center will
likely learn much about the important aspects of the industry. Nevertheless, the Special Study found that a major problem with on-the-job trainSpecial Study pt. 1, at 12, 16. There is no upper limit on the number of allied members
in the New York Stock Exchange; there were 6,238 in 1962. Id. pt. 1, at 12. In general,
an allied member has no right to be on the floor of the exchange. NYSE CoNSTITUTlON
art. IX,§ 11.

56 Special Study pt. 1, at 80-81. It is significant that the investigations of the Special
Study have accelerated the efforts of the various regulatory bodies to impose higher
qualification standards for securities personnel. For example, as of January, 1962, an
applicant for regular membership on the American Stock Exchange was not required to
have any experience, knowledge, or training in the securities business, and no examina•
tion tested his qualifications. Now the six-month training period is required. See SEC,
REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CoNoucr OF MEMBERS OF
THE AMERICAN STOCK ExcHANGE 7 (1962).
57 NYSE RULE 342.
58 Special Study pt. 1, at 138.
59 NYSE RULE 10.
60 NYSE RuLE 345.15. It should be noted that the NYSE provides for a system of
limited registration under which the salesman may sell only -mutual fund shares or
stock selected by the salesman's firm under a Monthly Investment Plan. Formerly, the
NYSE required only one month's training for limited registrants. See NYSE RULE
30I.15(b); NYSE RuLE 301.ll(b). The Exchange now requires that limited registrants have
three months of training. Also, limited registration selling may continue only for a seven•
month period. The examination for limited registrants contains two-thirds of the material
in the regular NYSE test for registered representatives. See Special Study pt. I, at 126-28.
61 Id. at 105.
62 Id. at 106-07.
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ing is that firms are frequently content to let their trainees watch the
regular employees sell securities for the full six-month training period.
The candidates do not obtain actual training practice under the supervision of regular firm personnel.63 Moreover, many firms send their trainees
to a remote branch office far from the financial centers of the nation,
where on-the-job training consists of the performance of menial tasks.
The major defect in the training requirements for salesmen on the New
York Stock Exchange is that, while the Exchange imposes a six-month
training period, it does not evaluate the quality of the training programs
established by the member firms.
Prior to December, 1962, applicants for membership and allied membership in the New York Stock Exchange had to pass either the examination for registered representatives or specified courses at universities
approved by the Exchange.64 The Board of Governors of the NYSE, however, has now established a compulsory written examination for members
and allied members; it covers general securities subjects, exchange rules
and procedures, the responsibilities of proprietors of member firms, and
the supervision of offices, salesmen, and accounts. Inexperienced members
and allied members who plan to service customers' accounts must also pass
the Exchange examination for registered representatives. 65 The revised
compulsory examination for registered representatives now covers securities market procedure, securities and their analysis, and elements of finance.
In addition, the NYSE plans a separate written examination dealing with
problems of supervisory responsibility for branch office managers. Both
the American and Midwest Stock Exchanges require that registered representatives pass a written examination; these exchanges will soon require
an examination for proprietors similar to that of the NYSE.
In the matter of character standards, the NYSE undertakes an elaborate
investigation of the integrity of a prospective member or allied member.
It utilizes the facilities of its staff as well as independent investigating
agencies to check the applicant's business history, personal reputation, and
educational background. Applicants must be sponsored by two members
or allied members of at least one year's standing who will recommend the
candidate from personal knowledge of him and of his business connections. 66 In an effort to improve the quality of its members' salesmen, the
NYSE has recommended that its member firms require applicants to take
aptitude tests and undergo a series of personal interviews. In addition, some
exchange firms frequently hire an outside investigating agency to check on
the background of the applicant prior to the final decision to accept him
for employment.
All exchanges impose on their member firms requirements as to both
oa Id. at 107.
64 NYSE. RULE 301.12.
llll Special Study pt. 1,
Oil NYSE RuLE 301.24.

at 78.
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minimum capital and aggregate debt to net capital ratios. For example,
the New York Stock Exchange requires that a member firm doing a general business with the public have net capital of 50,000 dollars and maintain a twenty-to-one ratio between its aggregate indebtedness and its net
capital.67 In addition, the initial net capital of a member firm must be
at least 120 percent of the minimum net capital requirement. 68 The Commission has exempted all members of the major exchanges from its net
capital rule because the capital requirements of the exchange are more
comprehensive than Rule 15c3-I.69

4. State Controls
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains an express provision
preserving the jurisdiction of state Blue Sky securities Iaws. 70 A state has
a legitimate interest in establishing qualification standards for brokers,
dealers, and salesmen in order to protect its citizens. Consequently, fortyseven states require the registration of broker-dealers,71 and forty-eight
states impose the duty of registration upon salesmen.72 Supervisors and
analysts, however, insofar as they do not engage in selling activities, need
no~ register under state Blue Sky laws. It is significant that in New York,
the leading commercial state of the nation, the registration requirements
for broker-dealers and salesmen may be easily satisfied.73 An applicant
need only list his business history for the preceding five years, his criminal
record, and his educational background. Registration is automatic. Since
there are no provisions for the denial or revocation of the registration of
broker-dealers and salesmen, it is apparent that the registration provisions
are only an adjunct to the criminal fraud provisions.
It would appear that state Blue Sky legislation could be extremely
helpful in protecting the public in two particular areas. First, the states
might enact minimum capital surety bond requirements. 74 Since the state
67 NYSE RULE 325(a). The American and Midwest Stock Exchanges require that
member firms doing business with the public have net capital of $50,000 and $25,000,
respectively. ASE Rule 446(a); Special Study pt. 1, at 88.
68 NYSE RuLE 325(a).
69 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-lb2 (Cum. Supp. 1963). The exemption may be withdrawn
by the Commission upon ten days notice to the exchanges when it is necessary in the
public interest.
70 Exchange Act § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1958).
71 Delaware, Nevada, and the District of Columbia do not have Blue Sky securities
legislation. Wyoming does not require the registration of broker-dealers.
72 Wyoming requires that a promoter offering securities for sale "either as principal
or through brokers or agents" file the names and addresses of his agents, partners, and
ten percent shareholders with the secretary of state. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-103(7), (8)
(1957).
73 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359(e).
74 Section 202(e) of the Uniform Securities Act provides that the Administrator may
by rule require broker-dealers to post surety bonds up to $10,000, but no bond is required
for any registrant whose net capital exceeds $25,000. See Loss &: CoWETT, PROPOSED UNI•
FORM SECURITIES Ac:r (1956). New Mexico provides for both a minimum capital requirement and a net capital rule. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20 (Supp. 1961). Michigan pro•
vides that every broker-dealer must post a $10,000 surety bond. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.762
(1959).
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securities commissions would be familiar with the securities transactions
generally prevalent in the community, they could establish an absolute
minimum capital for the one-man proprietorship and require increased
capital for firms with additional branch offices and salesmen. The defrauded private investor could resort to the surety bond in satisfaction of
his claim against the firm. Second, the state securities commissions should
be given power to deny the registration of broker-dealers and salesmen for
lack of training, knowledge, or experience in the securities business, and to
revoke registrations for dishonest or unethical selling practices. Such a
provision applicable to broker-dealers is included in the qualification section
of the Uniform Securities Act, presently adopted by fifteen states.75 Under
the Uniform Act the administrator is authorized in his discretion to give a
written examination to any class of applicants. 76 Unfortunately, the enforcement of state Blue Sky laws remains handicapped by low budgets, small
staffs, and local political pressures.77 Thus, with the possible exception of a
few major industrial states, the effectiveness of state securities legislation in
protecting the public against abuses by personnel in the securities industry is
extremely uncertain. The public must therefore look to the Commission,
the exchanges, and self-regulatory associations for adequate qualification
standards and nonpartisan enforcement.
C. The Special Study Report
I. Recommendations at the Federal Level
Under the present federal law, when an employee of a broker-dealer
firm violates any provision of the securities acts or any of the regulations
issued pursuant to these acts by the Commission, the SEC must proceed
against the firm. This may be a considerable hardship on an innocent
firm unaware of the dishonest conduct of its employee. Consequently, the
Commission and the Special Study have proposed that the SEC be given
the power to take disciplinary action directly against the individual wrongdoer. 78
75 Uniform Securities Act §§ 204(a)(2)(I), (a)(2)(C). States which have adopted the
qualification section of the Uniform Securities Act: ALA. CoDE tit. 53, § 29 (Supp. 1961);
ALASKA CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 45.55.030 to .55.060 (1962); Au;. STAT. §§ 67-1237 to -1240
(Supp. 1961); CoLO. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 125-10-2 to -10-5 (Supp. 1961); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1254 (Supp. 1961); KY. REY. STAT. ANN. § 292.330 (1962); MD. ANN. CoDE art.
32A, §§ 15-18 (Supp. 1962); MoNT. REY. CoDES ANN. § 15-2006 (Cum. Supp. 1963); N.J.
REv. STAT. §§ 49:3-9 to -11 (Supp. 1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 201-04 (Supp. 1962);
S.C. CoDE §§ 62-101 to -122 (1962); WASH. REY. CoDE ANN. § 21.20.040 to .130 (1961).
Three other states have adopted the Uniform Act without the qualification section for
broker-dealers: HAWAII REY. LAws §§ 199-1 to -20 (Supp. 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-829
to -853 (1960); VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to -527 (1956).
76 Uniform Securities Act § 204(b)(6). Kansas requires an examination only of those
broker-dealers and salesmen who have not passed the tests for the American, New York,
Midwest, or Pacific Coast Stock Exchanges. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1254(b) (Supp.
1961) and Rule 81-8-1, 1 CCH BLUE SK.Y L. REP. 1[ 19613 (1962).
77 See l Loss 105-107. But see Blue Sky Crackdown, The Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1963,
p. I, col. 8.
78 Special Study pt. 1, at 160. H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963); S. 1642.
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963).
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A serious problem encountered by the Special Study involves the extent
to which many smaller firms have hired "boiler-room" salesmen with past
records of employment by firms against which the Commission has taken
disciplinary action. While these boiler-room veterans were willing participants in the proscribed conduct of the firm, the Commission was often
unable, for administrative reasons, to make them parties to the disciplinary
proceedings.79 This problem would be remedied if the Commission could
bring disciplinary proceedings directly against individual wrongdoers.
Moreover, the Commission has recommended that it be made unlawful
for a firm to hire a salesman without the consent of the Commission when
a disciplinary order has been entered against him, and the firm with reasonable care should have known of the order.80
The Commission has proposed that it be given the power to take disciplinary action against a firm or employee who aids, abets, counsels, or
fails reasonably to supervise the employee who actually committed the
violation of the particular provision, rule, or regulation. 81 Thus the Commission could put pressure on firms to improve their procedures for detecting violations of the securities acts by their employees. At the same
time, however, the firm with an adequate supervisory system would be
protected. A brokerage firm could assert as a valid defense in an action
brought against it by the Commission that it had established checkin~
procedures which were reasonably designed to detect securities violations
by its employees, and that it reasonably performed its duties under such
a system without knowledge of the activities of the fraudulent salesman. 82
At present, full revocation of a firm's registration is the Commission's
only disciplinary tool. This may be a harsh remedy when the firm has
committed only a minor violation. At the same time, it does not seem
just that the firm should totally escape any penalty. The Commission has
therefore proposed that it be given the power in its discretion to revoke
fully, or suspend up to twelve months, the registration of an offending firm,
or the right of any person to be associated with the firm. 88 Alternatively,
the Commission could censure the guilty fi.rm. 84 Thus the Commission
would be adequately equipped to deal with a relatively minor violation
by a broker-dealer principal or salesman. As a supplementary measure,
the Commission has suggested that the conviction disqualification for registration be broadened to include any felony or any misdemeanor involvSee 2
so H.R.
81 H.R.
82 H.R.
(1963).
83 H.R.
(1963).
84 H.R.
(1963).
79

Loss 1314-23.
6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1963).
6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1963).
6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16
6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17
6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 17
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ing securities, to correspond with the requirements of the Investment
Advisers Act,85
2. Compulsory Membership in Self-Regulatory Associations

It should be recognized that the Special Study and Commission proposals at the federal level relate only to improved detection and punishment of the prohibited acts of misconduct constituting statutory disqualification. No affirmative standards of knowledge, experience, and training
have been proposed. Both the Special Study and the Commission have
taken the position that self-regulatory associations should have the primary
responsibility for promulgating such positive qualification standards for
their member firms. As a condition of registration with the Commission,
the broker-dealer would be required to become a member of a registered
national securities association.86 The self-regulatory associations would be
given power to require standards of experience, training, and knowledge,
including a mandatory examination for each class of applicants. This
proposal constitutes the most important recommendation of the Special
Study in the area of qualifications, for it combines two vital objectives.
Under this compulsory membership plan, stricter qualification standards
would lead to a higher level of professional responsibility among member
firms in their dealing with private investors. Moreover, the fact that a
self-regulatory group rather than a government agency will enact the higher
entrance standards is likely to be conducive to more enthusiastic response
by member firms, in both the designing and enforcement of such standards.
Ultimately, higher qualification standards for securities personnel should
engender increased public confidence in all phases of the securities markets.
The Special Study recommended that the basic test for the competence
of securities personnel be the examination.87 The ideal examination would
contain a core of basic securities subjects, with sections of increased breadth
and difficulty for those performing proprietary or supervisory responsibilities. The Special Study also proposed that an experience requirement be
imposed on at least one principal of each broker-dealer firm, and preferably all supervisors.88 This proposal is desirable because proprietary and
supervisory positions should be filled by men with acknowledged abilities
in leadership, supervision, and coordination of firm activities. Firms with
inexperienced principals, it should be remembered, have been involved in
a large percentage of the serious disciplinary actions by the SEC. 89 Finally,
the Special Study urged that all analysts and investment advisers whose
85 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18
(1963); see special Study pt. 1, at 159.
86 H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-23 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-23 (1963).
See also Special Study pt. 1, at 159.
81 Id. at 160-61.
88 Id. at 161.
so See notes 24 &: 35 supra.
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unsupervised investment recommendations are actually transmitted to the
public should be subjected to an entrance examination.9o Such a recommendation is meritorious, since one who directly advises private investors
about securities should be subjected to at least a minimal requirement of
competence.
With reference to standards of integrity, the Special Study proposed
that there be established local character and fitness committees to pass on
the character of each applicant. However, the Special Study disapproved
of the NASD system of member certification of the integrity of registered
representatives on the ground that member firms too frequently make only
cursory checks of the backgrounds of their candidates.91 However, the
NASD system is not entirely without merit, because it places maximum responsibility on the firm to train only those applicants of the highest integrity. While committees of the self-regulatory associations may appropriately supervise the general character standards of salesmen, it is the
individual firm which makes the final decision to hire the applicant. A
member firm, therefore, should have an obligation to use reasonable diligence in its character check upon potential salesmen. Stronger disciplinary
action by self-regulatory associations could make this duty one that must
be obeyed in fact. The NASD is now processing over 30,000 applications
each year for registered representatives; 92 obviously, character committees
cannot feasibly make a thorough check on the background of each candidate.
It is submitted that all the self-regulatory associations should require
a six-month training program for inexperienced personnel of member firms,
as the NYSE presently does. 93 The content of a minimum training program should include on-the-job training, supplemented by organized outside study, either at a local university or by correspondence. The associations should supervise the manner in which firms carry out their training
programs. A salesman-trainee should not be allowed to deal with the public until his training period has been completed. In addition, the associations might require a minimum rate of compensation for salesmen-trainees
in order to decrease the high rate of turnover during training periods.9 •
This turnover rate resulting from inadequate compensation makes it more
difficult to train and retain capable men.
The Special Study recommended that the self-regulatory associations
be given power to enact minimum capital requirements for member firms. 911
The NASD has long advocated such a requirement. Indeed, in National
Ass'n of Securities Dealers96 the NASD proposed an amendment to its byspecial Study pt. 1, at 158.
Id. at 117-118, 161.
92 Id. at 117.
93 See note 55 supra.
94 Special Study pt. 1, at 96-98.
95 Id. at 161-62.
96 12 S.E.C. 322 (1942); cf. DeWitt Investment Co., 27 S.E.C. 976 (1948) (NASD may
not impose quantitative standards for membership).
90

91
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laws requiring that all members and prospective members dealing directly
with the public have a minimum net capital of 5,000 dollars. The Commission, however, held that a minimum capital requirement was not an
appropriate basis for determination of membership under the 1934 Act.
The Commission has now proposed that self-regulatory associations be
given authority to promulgate standards dealing with financial responsibility
of member firms. 01
The minimum capital requirement is a worthwhile recommendation.
The paramount public interest necessitates that firms with marginal capital
be excluded from participation in the securities industry. Factual findings
from the Special Study demonstrate that low capital firms have engaged
excessively in the underwriting of speculative stocks and have incurred a
large proportion of violations of the net capital rules of the SEC.98 Even
a competent person ought to be prevented from starting his own brokerage
firm if he does not have adequate financial backing. Such a person, however, could be employed as a salesman for a member firm.
3. The Part-Time Salesman

Another major problem facing the Special Study was the future of the
part-time salesman. Unlike the exchanges, which require that all registered representatives devote their full time to the business of their member
firms, 00 the NASD has permitted its member firms to employ part-time
salesmen. During 1961, of the 40,590 persons registered as salesmen with
the NASD, 20,990 stated that they were employed on a part-time basis with
NASD member firms. 100 Mutual fund firms, in particular, have hired a
large percentage of part-time salesmen. Opponents of part-time salesmen
have argued that this group lacks adequate training, engages in overly
aggressive selling tactics, and exhibits improper supervision. The Special
Study concluded that, where these characteristics exist in securities firms,
they are common to both full-time and part-time salesmen. The Report
therefore recommended that part-time and full-time salesmen should be
subjected to the same qualification standards.101 This suggestion that improved entrance standards be applicable to all salesmen across the board is
reasonable. It would appear that if a man desires to sell securities in the
over-the-counter market on a part-time basis, he ought to be able to do so,
provided he can comply with standards adequate to protect the public. In
the remote areas of the country, a part-time salesmen could promote interest
in stock investment. Such a salesman, however, should get no special privileges because of his limited status.
H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963); S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963).
Special Study pt. 1, at 91-92.
09 See, e.g., NYSE RuLE 346.
100 special Study pt. I, at 112.
101 Id. at 161.
07
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D. Conclusion
The Special Study concluded that, with regard to standards and qualifications of personnel in the securities industry, the philosophy underlying
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 is outmoded. These acts were motivated by the belief that any person
not guilty of particular acts of misconduct constituting statutory disqualifi.
cation should be permitted to operate his own brokerage firm. The contention of the Special Study, however, is that the tremendous growth and
complexity of the securities industry102 requires that personnel satisfy
standards of knowledge, experience, and training, and that securities firme
demonstrate adequate financial responsibility. To accomplish this objective,
both the Special Study and the Commission have recommended that all
broker-dealer firms be compelled to become members of self-regulatory
associations.103 Such a requirement would be a condition of the firm's
registration with the SEC. Thus each group-put-and-call dealers, real
estate securities firms, and mutual fund firms-might have its own selfregulatory association. These associations would have the responsibility of
enacting qualification standards. This proposal is an excellent recommendation, since it would likely engender enthusiastic response by the member
firms in both the promulgation and the enforcement of standards.
The associations must devise a comprehensive scheme of entrance requirements designed to assure that personnel entering the securities industry are adequately trained. An examination with a core of basic securities subjects should be required of all securities salesmen. The examination
should contain sections of increased difficulty and breadth for those with
ownership and supervisory responsibilities. In particular, ethical considerations should be stressed in the examination. The Special Study has proposed
that at least one principal of each broker-dealer, and preferably every
supervisor, be required to have experience in the industry. The associations
could establish certain categories of work which would qualify as adequate
experience. This would be particularly important when a firm recruits a
supervisor from an outside organization. Also, the associations should require a six-month training period, prior to which a salesman could not sell
to the public. In addition, the associations should establish a model train102 Although the number of member firms on the New York Stock Exchange has
only increased from 586 firms in 1945 to 672 firms in 1962, the number of salesmen
employed by exchange firms has risen from 7,989 at the end of 1945 to 32,555 at the
end of 1962. Also, the number of branch offices has increased from 841 in 1945 to 2,737
in 1962. Id. at 46. In particular, the Merrill Lynch firm, the nation's largest brokerage
firm in terms of income, has increased the number of its salesmen from 1,038 in 1951
to 2,054 in May 1962. Bache & Company has increased the number of its salesmen from
100 in 1945 to 1,414 in 1962. Id. at 22. Likewise, the number of NASD members has
more than doubled since 1945. In 1962 there were 4,771 firms, as compared with only
2,372 in 1945. The number of registered representatives in the NASD has increased from
24,843 in 1945 to 94,444 in 1962. The number of branch offices operated by NASD members
has risen from 790 in 1945 to 4,713 in 1962. Id. at 36.
10a Id. at 159.
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ing program and maintain effective surveillance over the quality of the
training programs of their member firms. The associations should also adopt
an educational prerequisite for registered representatives. At the same time,
however, it would seem that in appropriate cases an applicant with inadequate formal education should be able to qualify upon successful completion of the training program and a high mark of achievement on the
examination. Member firms should certify the integrity of an applicant
after a reasonably diligent search of his background. Local character committees could supervise both the firm's investigatory techniques and the
general character standards for salesmen. Finally, a minimum capital requirement should be adopted by the associations. Such a rule would eliminate the marginal capital firms which are responsible for a large percentage
of violations of the Commission's regulations.
The eventual result of a comprehensive set of qualification standards
enacted by the self-regulatory associations might well be the evolution of
the securities industry into a profession. The broker-dealer might assume
a professional status similar to that of the lawyer or physician. A profession
has been defined as "a limited and clearly marked group of men who are
trained by education and experience to perform certain functions better
than their fellowmen." 104 A profession is characterized by a clear demarcation of functions. Thus the lawyer advises his client only as to applicable
law. In a similar manner, the stockbroker should advise his customers
concerning the relevant attributes of the securities under consideration.
Another important aspect of a profession is that its members have been
subjected to rigid entrance requirements. At the present time, outside of
the NYSE, the entrance requirements for securities personnel have not
reached a level characteristic of the professions. Thus the stockbroker is
not presently regarded as a member of a profession. However, the selfregulatory associations, by raising the qualification standards for entrance
throughout the securities industry, could enable brokers and salesmen to
attain a greater degree of professional discipline and public esteem.
A profession is also characterized by the paramount responsibility of its
members to the public. Professional men have a duty to society to prefer
the social good and the welfare of the profession to individual economic
objectives which might prejudice those goals. It is clear, however, that
fraudulent practices are all too frequent in the securities industry today.
Nevertheless, since the Special Study found that inexperienced principals
are responsible for a large part of the more serious violations of the securities acts and regulations, it is reasonable to believe that, with better trained
personnel, unlawful activity within brokerage firms might be sharply decreased. Finally, a most important attribute of a profession is the existence
of professional organizations which formulate standards of ethical and business conduct and have the power to exercise disciplinary control over the
10~ TAEUSCH, PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ETHICS

13 (1926).
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actions of individual practitioners. This objective dictates greater authority
for self-regulatory associations.
The securities industry should adopt as a primary goal the achievement
of public recognition of the stockbroker and his fellow workers as members of a profession. Enlarged control by self-regulatory associations would
be a major step in this direction. Self-regulation would also avoid the
dangers involved in excessive direct government controls.105 The first step
in this direction should be association enactment and enforcement of
higher qualification standards for members of the securities industry who
deal with the public.
II.

CORPORATE PUBUCITY

The availability and dissemination of information concerning publicly
held corporations has a significant impact on the volume traded and the
market price of a corporation's securities.106 Under present law, required
disclosures are limited by their failure effectively to reach the problems of
"unofficial"107 corporate publicity after the issuance of securities, and the
publicity problems arising from issuance. Thus, the finding of the Special
Study that some corporate public relations departments and their financial
public relations consultants have prepared and disseminated material contrary to the basic philosophy and purpose of full disclosure and protection
of investors108 points up the need for new laws and policies to set a higher
minimum level of required disclosure, encourage additional voluntary
disclosure, and police the substantive merits of all corporate publicity.
A. Prevailing Disclosure Requirements

The prevailing requirements of corporate disclosure can be categorized
in the following four groups: statutory disclosure arising from the issuance
of new securities; statutory disclosure resulting after the issuance process is
completed; requirements imposed on listed corporations by the stock exchanges; and requirements imposed on corporations the securities of which
are included in the NASD's retail quotations for the over-the-counter
market. The problems emanating from these requirements relate to definition of standards and effectuation of a meaningful enforcement procedure.
On the other hand, the thrust of the Special Study's findings and recommendations dealt with the areas where the need for regulation of corporate
publicity had not been deemed necessary or proper in the past. Thus, in
order to determine what additional regulation is warranted, one must first
look at the existing requirements and evaluate their advantages and failings.
Bowen, Business Management: A Profession1, 297 AM. ACAD. PoL. 8: Soc. ScL
112, 117 (1955).
10s spedal Study pt. 3, at 70.
107 "Unofficial" publicity is all information disseminated about a corporation which
is not required by statute, the SEC, or any group acting as a regulatory body.
10s Id. at 2.
105

ANNALS
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The statutory requirements of disclosure arising from the issuance of a
new security stem from section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.109 Under
section 5(c) it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make
use of any means or instrument of interstate commerce or of the mails, to
offer to sell or offer to buy a security, unless a registration statement has
been filed with the Commission as to such security.110 The registration
statement requires the inclusion of a wide range of significant factual information111 which, upon filing, must be made available to the public.112
In addition to the registration statement, a prospectus containing the same
information must be prepared by the corporation for distribution. 113 During the period between filing and the effective date of a registration statement, no written communication offering the security may be used, except
an identifying statement or prospectus.114 After the effective date, sales
publicity other than a prospectus may be used; however, for a forty-day
period following the effective date or the commencement of the public
offering, a prospectus must either precede or accompany all such publicity.1115 These detailed requirements assure a means whereby those interested may have information upon which to make investment decisions.
However, several factors militate against the effectiveness of these requirements. One of these is that few people analyze or even read the prospectus.
Also, difficulties arise with respect to the provision that no "offer" can be
made prior to the effective date of registration. Little can be said about the
human foible of failure to take advantage of the available information;
however, clarification of the requirement that no "offer" be made prior to
the effective date of registration is needed, as its ambiguity dampens the
full effectiveness of the policy of full disclosure. Section 2(3) defines "offer to
sell" as including every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security or an interest in a security for value. 116 This definition of "offer to sell" is considerably broader than the common-law concept
of an offer, and it has been so construed by the courts. The problem of
whether there is a violation of this provision when publicity disseminated
prior to registration concerns either the issue itself or the issuing corporation. While it is clear that a short press release announcing a quarterly
dividend does not constitute an "offer," and that a full-fledged publicity
campaign advertising the issue before filing is a violation, whether an
activity between these extremes constitutes a violation rests solely on the
facts of each particular case.
109 Since all issues of securities offered publicly, by use of the mails, or by other
interstate means, fall within the registration requirements, most new issues, including
those not registered on an exchange, are included. Id. at 2-3.
110 68 Stat. 684 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
111 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1958).
112 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(d) (1958).
113 68 Stat. 685 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1958).
114 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(l) (1958).
ms 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l0) (1958).
116 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1958).
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To add some certainty to this area, the Commission, in 1954, published
Release No. 3844,117 dealing with the publication of information prior to,
or after the effective date of registration. The release set out a series of
examples of corporate publicity surrounding issuance and stated the Commission's opinion on each in the hope of clarifying the law in this area. In
the first set of examples the Commission stated that both the distribution
of a brochure through the underwriter-promoter and the dissemination of
a series of press releases, in an attempt to awaken the public, are violations.
Additionally, the Commission pointed out that violative publicity need not
be aimed at the general public. Another example was an investment banking firm which was about to underwrite an issue of securities. Without
being fully aware of the prospective underwriting, the research department
prepared a brochure on tjie company in line with its customary policy of
distributing reports to its clients concerning securities it had previously
sold. The Commission concluded that the participation of this underwriting
firm in the distribution would propound difficulties under section 5. This
example illustrates some of the major problems of uncertainty in this area.
First, is the knowledge of one department in a firm imputed to the research department? Second, assuming no such imputation of knowledge,
should the publication of a brochure containing typical financial information be construed as a violation of the act when such publication is in
accord with past patterns of publicizing the issuing company? Clearly,
more than mere knowledge of the coming issue combined with an intent to
publish is necessary, because the true intent of the firm may be to advise its
clients rather than awaken interest to purchase the new securities. The final
set of examples raised problems concerning speeches delivered by company
officials. The Commission's position seems to be as follows: provided the
speech has not been arranged in contemplation of a public offering, no
objection should be made to its delivery; however, distribution of a printed
copy of the speech is frowned upon, and a request might be made by the
Commission that each member of the group who received a transcript also
receive a prospectus. The Commission seems to be on very shaky ground in
this area, because a printed version of a speech, with respect to the audience,
certainly constitutes no more an "offer to sell" than does oral delivery.
Moreover, it seems apparent-even when a printed speech reaches those
not present at the delivery-that if the oral delivery was not an "offer,"
its printed counterpart cannot constitute an "offer" unless it is distributed
later as part of a selling effort.
To solve some of these problems, Edward N. Gadsby, then chairman of
the Commission, made two speeches in 1958 in which he delineated the
general test of what constitutes an "offer to sell." 118 His suggested test
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844, March 2, 1954.
Gun Jumping Problems Under Section 5, 188 COMM. AND FIN. CHRoN. 2536 (1958):
Current Problems Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Release N. !JBU,
address by Edward N. Gadsby before the Central States Group of the Investment Bankers Association.
117
118
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weighs the circumstances surrounding a publication, the publication's
content, the timing, to whom it was addressed or communicated, the publisher, the manner of its publication, and its over-all effect, all with the
purpose of determining whether the release was a normal corporate publication or an attempt to condition the market. Although not in conflict
with the case law nor different from other legal tests which attempt to treat
each case separately on its facts, Gadsby's test is obviously indefinite. Its
indefiniteness is detrimental because it results in a minimum of corporate
publicity during the period preceding the issuance of securities. The lack
of full disclosure, especially when manifested by the withholding of information, may influence the price of a corporation's stock, and is likely to
result in undue advantage for insiders and pave the way for fraud. Thus,
in order to achieve the goal of full, accurate disclosure, and to retain the
force of section 5(c), a more definite test is needed, even though it might
result in less flexibility.
After the issuance of new securities has been completed, additional
disclosures are required by the Securities Exchange Act. Section 12 requires
all listed corporations to file a registration statement analogous to that required upon issuance. 119 In addition, section 13120 and regulations pursuant
thereto require that the information on record be kept up to date by
annual reports which include such information as a certified balance sheet,
a profit and loss statement, a listing of those who are the principal security
holders, the remuneration of officers and directors, and the status of stock
options exercised or outstanding.121 Furthermore, periodic reports of unusual events, such as changes in control, changes in asset distribution, the
institution of material legal proceedings, and any matter which requires a
vote of the security holders must be reported pursuant to Commission
regulations. 122
Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act,123 dealing with proxies, also
establishes disclosure requirements. By rules promulgated pursuant to that
section, the Commission requires a filing of solicitation materials and prescribes a waiting period. Although "solicitation" is defined very broadly,124
its thrust and effect is very similar to the treatment of "offers to sell." Thus
the Commission has taken the position that a prepared speech or release
for inclusion in general news media is proxy solociting material if it is
68 Stat. 686 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1958).
48 Stat. 908 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958).
Form 10-K-Regulations pursuant to § 13 of the Securities Act.
122 Form 8-K-Regulations pursuant to § 13 of the Securities Act. Also, short forms
of uncertified profit and loss and earned surplus statements are required semi-annually.
Form 9-K. Some real estate companies must report statements of profit and loss, cash
flow, and cash distributions to shareholders on a quarterly basis. Form 7-K.
123 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1958).
124 "(i) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a
form of proxy; (ii) Any request to execute or not execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or
(iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under
circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." Rule 14a-l. 17 C.F.R. § 240.Ha-l(f) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
110
120
121
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intended to condition public opinion and the opinion of stockholders
favorably to the publishers of the material.125 The key seems to be an intent
to align public opinion to the solicitor's cause. Despite the absence of an
articulated test of what elements constitute a "solicitation," it is likely that
the Commission's test applied to publicity consituting an "offer to sell" is
a sound analogy for the conservative attorney to follow in advising clients.
The net effect of the "disclosure requirements" after issuance, with the
limited exception of proxy solicitation rules, is significant; but their full
effectiveness is curtailed because they are in general limited to those securities registered on national exchanges, and by the fact that the disclosure
requirements do not prohibit the corporation from disseminating inconsistent information.120
The stock exchanges themselves encourage, and in many instances require, the disclosure of information about corporations listed on their
exchanges. The New York and American Stock Exchanges both require
prompt disclosure of any developments which might affect security values
or influence investment decisions of stockholders or the investing public,121
and encourage the telling of all phases of the corporation's story through
advertising and other means in all of the available news media. The basis
for requiring these prompt disclosures is to prevent insiders from obtaining
any advantage by acquiring information before it is available to the public.128 Accordingly, the NYSE has a stock-watching program to seek out and
detect any unusual activity or rumors about a corporation or its securities.
Upon discovery of such activity, the Exchange will usually urge full disclosure or, in the extreme, suspend trading until the market for the stock
is stabilized.129 Both the exchanges require all listed companies to issue
annually to their shareholders independently audited financial statements.
Furthermore, these same statements must be submitted to the statistical
services, the newspapers, and the wire services.130 The NYSE also requires
listed corporations to solicit proxies for all shareholders' meetings, and the
AMEX is in the process of adopting this same policy.131 The Midwest and
Pacific Coast Stock Exchanges have analogous prompt disclosure provisions
requiring the reporting of all dividend news. They also investigate a listed
company when unusual activity occurs in its stock,132 and require corporations to send their shareholders independently audited statements.183 However, neither the Midwest nor the Pacific Exchange has any formal policy
concerning the distribution of other corporate news by listed companies.
125 SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
120 See special Study pt. 3, at 89-90.
127

N.Y. Stock Exchange, Company Manual A20-22; Special Study pt. !I, at 98.

128 Special Study pt. 3, at 98.
129 Id. at 97-98.
130 Id. at 5.
131 Ibid.
132 Id. at 98-99.
133 Id. at 5.
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The disclosure provisions of the exchanges encourage the availability
and dissemination of corporate publicity; however, there is no meaningful
policy regarding the substantive content of such publicity. The view is
that, since an exchange is normally unable to determine the accuracy of
corporate publicity at the time it is issued, an attempt to do so at a later
time would be second guessing the company.184 Furthermore, the prompt
disclosure requirements prevent a company from giving out information
on a "hold for release" basis. 135 Thus, the opportunity for financial reporters to make independent investigations which might lead to unbiased
articles is virtually eliminated, leaving editors with the choice of accepting
the release substantially as it comes from the corporation or of foregoing
the dissemination of such information. 136 It seems clear, then, that the
interaction of the prompt disclosure requirements with both the strict rule
against "offers to sell" prior to the effective date of registration on a new
stock issue, and the solicitation provisions for proxies, present the possibility
that inconsistent duties may be imposed on the corporation.
The final group of disclosure requirements is that promulgated by the
National Association of Securities Dealers. Since 1962, corporations included
in the national and regional quotation lists of the NASD have been required to make prompt disclosure to the press of any corporate development which may affect the value of the companies' securities or have an
influential effect on an investor's decision to buy or sell. 137 These new requirements, although subject to the same limitations as the prompt disclosure requirements of the exchanges, serve the important purpose of
bringing a substantial segment of the publicly held corporations under some
form of duty to disclose.
Although there exists a significant amount of information flow due to
the existing requirements of disclosure, it is apparent that there are defects
in the scope of the system. Elimination of these defects and the formulation
of a coordinated, comprehensive plan for the comprehensive and effective
disclosure of all valid substantive information concerning publicly held
corporations is certainly in order.

B. The Study's Findings of Abuse and Potential Abuse of Corporate
Publicity
The Special Study indicated that some of the corporate publicity disseminated over the past years has been inaccurate and misleading, and that
these abuses have become increasingly frequent. 138 Some of the more B.aId. at 99.
A bulletin distributed on a "hold for release" basis provides a time interval in
which those receiving it may investigate its merit.
186 See id. at 98.
187 Id. at 99.
188 Id. at 65. The Special Study based its findings on an intensive study of the fi.
nancial public relations activities of forty-six companies which were sent questionnaires,
and on an extensive examination of "five of these companies whose activities stood out
as demonstrating cunent or emerging problems."
184
135
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grant abuses stem from the activities of financial public relations consultants. As an illustration of methods used in the financial public relations
industry, the Study set forth a detailed publicity proposal submitted by
such a consultant to the General Development Corporation, a Florida land
developing company the common stock of which is traded on the American
Stock Exchange. The suggested publicity campaign was divided into four
parts, covering company relations with the investment community, the
financial press, its stock.holders, and the general public. In furtherance of
these relations, the primary devices suggested were "field trips" to Florida
for executives of influential investment firms, security analysts, and investment advisers; dinners and luncheons with investment and securities men
coupled with speaking engagements before investment and analyst associations; frequent press releases based on advanced timing considerations; a
letter giving figures on company progress "disguised as a news item"; the
publication of a monthly or quarterly shareholder's magazine or newsletter; and a series of "corporate image" advertisements in The Wall Street
Journal, Business Week, Barron's and other news magazines. 139 Obviously,
all of these suggested recommendations could be used in a manner which
would preclude the proliferation of inaccurate or misleading information;
however, the Special Study found that entertainment, field trips, and
luncheons are an important part of the financial public relations budget,HO
and that speaking engagements, especially before such groups as the New
York Society of Security Analysts, are a prime goal of the public relations
agent.141 These findings lead one to believe that there is a likelihood that
the information disseminated as a result of this type of publicity program
will be based on undue influence rather than objective, factual reporting.
This seems especially true when the "field trips" are to properties located
in Florida or other desirable places of recreation. Indeed, the lesson which
can be drawn from these promotion suggestions is that if corporations must
spend significant sums of money and exert a considerable amount of
energy in order to tell their stories, many will come to feel that such activity
should produce immediate beneficial results.142
The preparation of material for the use of security analysts is another
area where financial public relations activities may result in the dissemination of incorrect and misleading information. This is especially true in
cases where it is the public relations man who writes the final version of
Id. at 78-81.
Id. at 85.
141 Id. at 83.
142 The Study reported that in 1961 the General Development Corporation invited
twenty-one analysts to its Florida properties. The trip lasted over four days, including
one day at the company's country club. "Of the 18 brokerage houses represented on
these junkets, 5 issued market letters favorable to the company within 3 months • • •
and 6 others indicated approval in internal communications. In addition, an investment
advisory service recommended the stock and a large foundation which was represented
on the trip purchased a large block of convertible debentures." Id. at 86.
189

140
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material to be sent to investors over the name of investment advisers.148
For instance, one firm regularly prepares a report for its corporate clients
emphasizing favorable information which many times includes highly optimistic predictions. It then provides many brokerage firms with copies of
these reports complete with the latter firms' names printed thereon so that
they can distribute "tout sheets" to their customers at no expense.144 Although these reports do carry a notation stating their origin, the print is
generally small enough for many customers to be misled into thinking that
the brokerage house is responsible for them.145
If the attitude of the financial public relations consultant were that of
an unbiased third party whose job was only to take basic data from the
corporation and make it available to the public via the media of inforination dissemination, the danger that much of said information may. be
incorrect or misleading would be greatly reduced. This, however, is not
the case. The attitude of the financial public relations consultant can be
most likened to that of a salesman of its client's stock.146 This is evidenced
by the advertisements which consultants use in attempting to secure corporations as clients.147 When the totality of the publicity disseminated is
prepared and distributed by those who appear to be unbiased but who are
actually salesmen with the natural tendency to "puff" concerning their
wares-avoiding the bad points and overstating the good points-the detrimental effects of reliance thereon is readily apparent.148 Some companies
compensate these consultants with options to purchase the company's
stock. 149 The Study specifically stated that this practice does not necessarily
imply manipulation of the stock's price for personal gain or any analogous
improper intent on the part of the parties, but does suggest that, since
the consultant has no obligation to disclose his financial interest, those who
accept the publicity releases may not be aware that the information they
receive comes from an interested source under a situation in which conflict
of interest may produce a prejudiced result.11i0
Id. at 80-81.
Ibid.
The Dewitt Conklin reports had the following statement printed in small type:
"This report is released and distributed for and on behalf of the company in the interest of developing closer relations among the company, its stockholders and the financial community. The information contained and any opinions expressed in this report
arc solely those of the Management of the Company." Id. at 81.
146 "Whatever words are used, little doubt remains that their purpose is to increase
stock prices. Indeed some financial public relations men concede that they are salesmen
of their client's stock." Id. at 71.
H7 A large portion of such advertising lauds the prowess of the public relations firm
in placing articles in the press and having close contacts with security analysts and
advisers. Id. at 81.
us The reliability of the publicity, even if the financial public relations consultant
is not acting as a salesman, is also subject to question, because the consultant usually
acts as a conduit between the corporation and the public without checking the validity
of the information. Id. at 86-87.
149 Id. at 68-69.
150 Id. at 69-70.
143
144
145
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Another abuse is the use of publicity by one in control of a corporation
to further his own personal goals. The study cites, as one of the most
flagrant abuses of publicity by a corporate insider to influence stock. prices,
the case of SEC v. Louis E. W olfson,151 which concerned an attempt to
depress the price of American Motors Corporation common stock. in order
to cover a large short position. In this incident, Wolfson's financial consultant told a financial reporter that Wolfson and members of his family
were in the process of liquidating some seven percent of the outstanding stock. of American Motors. An article quoting the consultant, which
appeared shortly thereafter, had the effect of depressing the stock. price,
whereupon Wolfson was able to cover a substantial portion of his short
position. 152 Fortunately, the Commission was able almost immediately to
obtain an injunction requiring Wolfson to disclose the true facts and delaying him from further covering his short position. Although most publicity
does not include falsified information and is generally not incorrect or misleading, this by no means mitigates the problems of insider dealings.153
The snowballing effect-the rapid enlarging of a story at each repetition
-which occurs when an influential publication carries information about
a corporation, increases the detrimental reliance of the public on incorrect
or misleading information, because the placing of only one item can
achieve a totally unrealistic reaction.154 The possibility that the public
may rely to its detriment occurs even when the facts promulgated are
correct, because the presence of a barrage of information tends to excite
the public and cause price increases, even though the substance of the
information, if presented alone, would not have the same effect. Thus, by
an adroitly placed bit of news, a corporation can cause substantial fluctuations in the price of a given security. This effect was clearly illustrated in
the Report by the example of how Joseph Purtell, the senior editor in charge
of the business-news section of Time magazine, was able to make substantial
gains by simply purchasing shares of a corporation shortly before an article
on the company was due to appear.155 In one specific instance, a 350 percent price increase occurred in a period of less than a month, during which
rumors that Time was going to publish an article were circulated and the
article appeared. A questionnaire circulated by the Study showed that a
very large portion of those who purchased shares during the rise were
prompted to do so by the magazine article.156 Although this example is not
Civil File No. 135•30, S.D.N.Y.
Special Study pt. 3, at 72-73.
See id. at 71.
These are inherent limits to the effectiveness of such activity because an infor•
mation source can only remain respected when the information it disseminates holds
true or, "like the boy who cried 'wolf' [it] will end up being ignored." Id. at 76.
155 Joseph Purtell is no longer associated with Time magazine. Id. at 72-73.
156 Id. at 20. The price of Technical Animations, Inc. Class "B" common stock rose
from $4 to $13.75 between April 10, 1961, and April 27, 1961. Id. at 73, 75. A more
recent example of the effect a strategically placed magazine article can have on the price
of a stock of a corporation is that of Barnes Engineering Corp., reported in Newsweek,
151
152
158
154
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an instance of abuse of publicity by a corporation, it does emphasize an
area in which corporate management should feel some duty to the public.
I£ a corporation has any part in the initiation or promulgation of a scheme
whereby individuals will gain personally from a snowballing effect, it should
be subject to sanctions. Even if the corporation is an innocent bystanderespecially when incorrect information about its activities or financial data
is being put forth-it should feel ethically bound to see that this information is corrected by taking all reasonable steps under the circumstances.
The significance of the snowballing effect is also evident in the area of
over-enthusiastic or premature publicity concerning new product developments or sales and earnings estimates.157 The Study set forth an instance
involving the Fairbanks Whitney Corporation in which the company reported that it would soon obtain new pre-eminence in its field by virtue
of a practical desalinization technique. This report received wide publicity
in such respected magazines as Fortune, Look, and Newsweek, as well as The
Wall Street I ournal and other newspapers. Furthermore, the company was
mentioned in the advisory material of several prestigious brokerage houses.
Unfortunately for those who purchased in reliance on the publicity, the
predictions failed to materialize.158 Even if the company made the announcements in good faith and acted accordingly ever since, it was undoubtedly the initial cause in a chain of events which produced a misleading and inaccurate picture upon which some of the advisory services and,
more important, the public relied. Thus, management should not only
exercise caution and restraint in the release of such material, but should
feel a duty once an erroneous impression has been created to see that it is
corrected.
These areas cited by the Report should not be considered abuses in the
sense of unlawful acts which merely require the strengthening of sanctions
now in existence. Rather, they should be thought of as problem areas
Oct. 14, 1963, pp. 96-98. It is noted therein that "What turned out to be as wild a stock
buying spree as the Street had seen since the glamour-issue days of 1959-61 was a direct
reaction to an article in the Saturday Evening Post. The thermograph, said the Post,
'promises to save lives by detecting the hot infra red glow thrown off by deadly ailments,
including cancer.' " Stock in the Barnes firm was selling for under $18 when the Post
article appeared and added $10 in a single day. The American Stock Exchange stopped
trading because the orders could not be matched. After a day off the board it was put
back on and the price went up to $44. Again trading was held up; orders continued to
pour in and the tick.er flashed "PRESENT INDICATIONS 50-55 ..• WILL NOT OPEN
TODAY." However, trading never did open, and the president of the American Stock
Exchange suspended the stock indefinitely because the stock's activity "reflected a confused situation." One week after the appearance of the Post article, with the Amex
suspension, Barnes gravitated to the over-the-counter market, where the stock's price
dropped to $28.
See Special Study pt. 3, at 20.
The Fairbanks Whitney Corporation announced that it would soon have a commercial disalinization plant in operation. It also announced completion of the first massproduction unit, and promised to announce plans for a world wide marketing process.
Presently, two years after such predictions, the fulfillment is still wanting due to "technical delays." Id. at 91-92.
157
158
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where unethical practices can occur which might well be declared unlawful,
but which due to a present lack of statutory framework remain unpunishable. Thus, they emphasize the need for new legislation and policies which
can act not only as guide-lines for higher standards of conduct, but as
mechanisms for the enforcement of such conduct.
C. Correction of Abuses and Potential Abuses of Corporate Publicity
The presence of inaccurate and misleading information, although its
incidence be infrequent and its proliferation unintentional, has the effect
of presenting an unreal picture upon which the investing public may rely
to its detriment. Recognizing that there exist today numerous areas of abuse
or potential abuse, a scheme to encourage the development of accurate
and complete dissemination of corporation publicity is needed.
In order to evaluate the merit of any specific corporate publicity activity, one must keep in mind the possible underlying motivations for such
publicity. In any given instance, the primary purpose of the corporation's
use of publicity may be to sell the corporation's products, to increase its
prestige with the financial community in order to borrow capital readily,
to increase the price of its stock in order to facilitate financing by the
issuance of additional shares, to enable present shareholders to realize a
gain, or to proliferate the corporate name because of the egoism of a high
corporation officer.159 Most, if not all, of these reasons for the dissemination
of information can lead to beneficial results by making available, as a basis
for sound investment decisions, information about a publicly traded corporation. Abuses will arise when the net effect of publicity, due to any
motivation, results in information which creates erroneous impressions. If
the reason for the flow of publicity is the presentation of a product within a
normal advertising campaign, we might accept a deleterious effect in order
not to hamper corporate activities aimed at bona fide commercial purposes,
although the same effect might not be so palatable if the goal were merely
personal gain or egoism. Thus, not only must the net effect of the publicity be considered, but the practical justifications, if any, for such a consequence should be weighed. In addition to the motivation factor, the cause
of and responsibility for the misleading publicity must be evaluated.
In developing a standard for regulating the dissemination of factually
incorrect information, one must start from the premise that ideally all
such information should be curtailed. However, the application of a strict
standard prohibiting the dissemination of all incorrect information would,
in effect, require every organization which accepts any information from a
corporation to research it thoroughly before passing it on. This stringent
burden of research seems so restrictive that it would probably result in a
great depletion in the number of financial public relations consultants and
thus lead to a curtailing of the reliable voluntary corporate publicity now
~159

Id. at 78.
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being disseminated.160 Since the application of strict liability to financial
public relations consultants is not desirable, a flexible standard for regulating the dissemination of incorrect information by them is needed, one
which will hold them accountable for disseminating any incorrect information they knew or should have known about. On the other hand, the imposition of strict liability on the corporate source, although it might likewise decrease the flow of voluntary publicity, seems desirable, because any
false publicity disseminated by a corporation about itself is best suppressed.
Thus a financial public relations firm would receive treatment different
from that of a division of a corporation performing the same function. However, under a flexible standard, those firms closely associated with the corporation could be subjected to a greater degree of care than those firms
acting at arm's length vis-a-vis the corporation. This should make the
difference between the treatment accorded a corporate division and a private
firm which has an equal opportunity to corroborate the publicity it disseminates, almost minimal.161
It seems that the problem of defining the standard to be applied is
most difficult in the area of dissemination of incomplete information.
Here, if one wishes to bring up questions of degree he meets the almost
unsolvable problem of "sales talk" vis-a-vis actual omission of material
facts. Another difficult question is whether a publicity release is complete
when it mentions only a new development of the corporation, without
placing it in the setting of the industry and the economy as a whole. In
this area also there must be a flexible standard, weighing all of the circumstances, if any type of meaningful regulation is to occur. Such flexibility
is necessary because the numerous fact situations which can arise would be
impossible to cover in any single piece of legislation.
The matter of saturation publicity raises questions of propriety as well
as of degree. Saturation publicity is intensive, simultaneous coverage of a
development in all available news media. Although such publicity is complete and accurate, its mere presence may cause a change in stock prices
from what would be the uninfluenced normal pattern. The basic question
here is whether a public market should be affected by extensive, albeit
accurate publicity, when the aim may be to condition the market for
financial activities. The statutory treatment of "offers to sell" prior to issuance and proxy solicitations answers this question in the negative by
regulating publicity which might condition the market. By analogy, one
might reason that all conditioning of the market is bad. However, in
100 Since many corporations seem to consider the use of financial public relations
firms a "luxury," curbing such expenditures when budgets must be cut, the increased
cost of supporting thorough research would probably be enough to curtail a significant
portion of the information normally distributed in this manner. See id. at 67.
161 If account is not taken of a financial public relations consultant's ability to corroborate its publicity releases, a premium would be placed on the splitting off of a
corporate division in order to avoid the automatic sanction if the information it disseminates is incorrect.
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furtherance of bringing forth as much corporate information as possible,
it seems best that regulation be limited to the areas of "offers to sell" prior
to issuance, proxy solicitation, and, hopefully, manipulations for personal
gain which do not have a foundation in furtherance of a corporate business
purpose. This result seems best when one considers the constitutionally
protected right of freedom of speech. Although it seems clear that the
present regulations and any suggested regulations curbing manipulative or
misleading practices would not fall within constitutional proscriptions, 102
the desire to regulate must always be weighed against the goal of our
society for freedom of activity and speech whenever possible.
The type of enforcement mechanism most suitable for the policing of
these solutions must also be considered. Although the law has not been
specifically concerned with "unofficial" corporate publicity, there are numerous statutory regulations designed to curb manipulative and fraudulent
activties of professionals in the securities markets; these suggest some possible answers.
The provision most applicable to curbing abuses of corporate publicity
is Rule IOb-5, promulgated under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. Section IO(b) makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
to make any untrue statement in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, or to make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not
misleading.163 Despite judicial holdings that IOb-5 gives a private remedy
to investors without the presence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, the applicability of the rule to fraudulent corporate
publicity is limited by the requirement that the information be disseminated in connection with a purchase or sale of the security.164 Furthermore,
the effectiveness of the rule is limited by the uncertainity of the extent of
liability for unintentional misrepresentation and the degree of reliance on
the defendant's misrepresentations by the plaintiff.16 5
Many states have also attempted to regulate false and fraudulent practices; however, the extent and effectiveness of these statutes has been
limited by strict construction and failure of prosecution. Thus, although
the Martin Act166 in New York, for example, does contain provisions
broader than the federal acts, the Study pointed out that only one case was
reported during the recent bull market, and there the court limited the
act's application to purchases through the misrepresenting party.167
The only self-regulatory body in the financial public relations industry
162 Problems might arise if sanctions were imposed for the dissemination of correct
information simply because it fell in an area where there have been a few practices
which could be classified as unethical.
163 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1958).
164 See 3 Loss 1767-71 for a general discussion of this area.
165 See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W:O,
Ky. 1960).
166 Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw, art. 23A.
167 Special Study pt. 3, at 97.

1964]

COMMENTS

713

is the Public Relations Society of America. This organization includes over
4,000 practitioners and encompasses many leading financial publicists; it
has a meaningful Code of Professional Ethics.168 However, its policing has
thus far involved only disputes concerning fees or clients. Despite this
dearth of effective self-regulation, it would be most desirable if this association were to become an effective force so that direct government control
would not be necessary.
These various provisions and modes of curbing manipulative and fraudulent activities suggest the possibility of an extension or liberalizing of their
provisions in order to cover the full range of abuses and potential abuses
of corporate publicity. Although this seems to be a fertile ground for constructive action, this will not suffice to effectuate all of the desirable corrective changes needed in this area. Therefore, a regulation and enforcement
program analogous to those existing under the labor and antitrust laws
should be considered. Not only do these areas provide a framework for tlie
policing by a federal agency of adherence to objective standards, but they
also exhibit systems wherein both private causes of action and government injunctive powers can be accommodated. Furthermore, they provide
examples of methods whereby the corporation and its officers can be subjected to both civil and criminal sanctions when necessary.
D. Recommendations of the Special Study

The Special Study concluded that prevention of abuses in the dissemination of information concerning publicly held corporations is not entirely
within the realm of legal control, due to the large volume of corporate
publicity, the paramount aim of full and prompt disclosure, the difficulty
of making judgments concerning specific items of publicity, and the
proximity of the field to the constitutional right of freedom of expression.169
However, in its three specific recommendations it did suggest certain
statutory actions, along with other remedies.170 The first recommendation
was that the stock exchanges and the NASD establish a set of high
standards for the dissemination of corporate publicity, to which the corporations the securities of which they list or quote would be required to conform.
These could take the form of statements of policy covering the types of
disclosure and publicity required or expected, and the types that should be
discouraged or excluded under certain circumstances. The second recommendation was that consideration be given the enactment of a statute
providing criminal sanctions and civil liability for intentional or reckless
dissemination of false and misleading statements, including forecasts un168 The Code of Ethics includes the following prohibitions: (1) A member is not to
engage in any practice which tends to corrupt the integrity of channels of public communication; (2) A member is not intentionally to disseminate false or misleading information and is obligated to use ordinary care to avoid dissemination of false or misleading
information. Id. at 99.
169 Id. at 102.
110 Ibid.
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warranted by existing circumstances which might reasonably be expected to
affect transactions in the issuer's securities. The third recommendation was
that the rules requiring disclosure under the securities acts be revised to
require disclosure of material facts concerning the compensation paid or
payable to any financial public relations consultant in the form of any
equity of the issuer.
Although the Study's recommendations are significant, they fail to advocate the necessary statutory reform needed to correct the problem shown to
exist. This is especially true with regard to the second recommendation,
which suggested only that a statute be "considered." If the Study's recommendations are to manifest themselves in genuinely effective reforms, a
force speaking with stronger conviction as to the need for new statutory
enactments will have to appear.
E. Conclusion
The Study, in dealing with the practice of paying public relations
advisers in equity securities of the issuer, recommended that all such payments be disclosed in the corporation's registration statements, offering
circulars, proxy statements, and subsequent reports. There is no question
that disclosure is an effective way of dealing with this problem; however,
the mere reporting that a financial public relations consultant has been
compensated in the equity securities of its employer does not seem sufficient.
The recommendation fails to deal with those abuses which are fostered by
the large expenditures on entertainment and "field trips" made by a number of corporations. Short of complete prohibition, the best way to eliminate
excessive expenditures is to require that such expenditures be fully reported. Furthermore, in order to make these required disclosures more
effective, it seems wise to require that all the data included in the registration statement, offering circulars, proxy statements, and subsequent reports
be distributed to the corporation's shareholders at least once a year. This
would not only bring these new disclosures to light and facilitate the dissemination of the other information included; it would also eliminate the
resultant misleading of innocent shareholders carried on by some corporations which distribute to their shareholders information different in import
from that required to be furnished to the Commission.
Another recommendation of the Study deals with the general problem
of creating applicable standards for the dissemination of corporate publicity. The Study's suggestion was that the stock exchanges and the NASD
can accomplish significant results by establishing high standards to which
companies over which they have some control would have to conform. Once
again, there is no question as to the wisdom of the recommendation. It
seems judicious to urge the independent associations and exchanges to
provide as much as possible of the needed regulation themselves, since it
minimizes the cost of administration and, more important, produces less
friction and avoids creating depressing effects on the market. Despite these
advantages of self-regulation, it is questionable whether promulgation of
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high standards alone would be sufficient, unless accompanied by a change
in the exchanges' attitude toward the policing of the substantive sufficiency
of disclosures. This is true because one of the major weaknesses of the
present regulation carried on by these groups is their failure to concern
themselves with the substance of corporate disclosures. These failures of
self-regulation, while not sufficient to outweigh the value of autonomous
action by the exchanges, demonstrate that self-regulation itself is not sufficient to curb all abuses of corporate publicity. Nevertheless, strict enforcement by the Public Relations Society of America of its Code of Professional
Standards for the Practice of Public Relations should be encouraged. Action
of this nature is the form of self-regulation which one might hope would
render unnecessary the enactment and enforcement of regulatory legislation.11011
The remaining recommendation of the Study also dealt with the applicable standards for the dissemination of corporate publicity; however, the
Study limited the thrust of this suggestion for a statutory solution by
advising merely that consideration be given to it, rather than advocating
that immediate action be taken, as with its other two recommendations.
Furthermore, the Study limited its suggestion for criminal sanctions and
civil liability to intentional or reckless actions. Unfortunately, the failure
to state that statutory action is necessary implies a belief that the other two
suggestions can alleviate the primary abusive practices in corporate publicity.
If civil liability is limited to intentional or reckless actions, the shortcomings of the laws covering manipulations and fraud, which fail effectively
to reach the corporation or its agents, still remain. Thus, it seems that this
final recommendation should have advocated positive action. It also should
have been wider in scope so as to provide a solution to the problems of
when a corporation is under a duty to come forward and disclose, what
remedies are available when violations occur, and who should have the
right to enforce the remedies.
The answers to these problems of corporate publicity are not easily
found; however, it seems that there exist in the regulation of proxies and
in national labor and antitrust legislation fertile analogies which could be
adopted and used effectively in the regulation of corporate publicity. The
Commission, if given power to exercise a prompt form of injunctive relief,
would be able to curb many abuses; moreover, if it had the power to require positive disclosures, it could curb nonfeasance as well as misfeasance.
The basis for action such as this would have to be a general authorization
of power encompassing the duty to see that no false or misleading impressions are created which could affect the prices of the securities of a publicly
held corporation. The problem of investigating such matters would be accomplished most efficiently if private individuals and the exchanges, in
addition to the Commission, were empowered to file complaints. These
170a Concerning a new financial code of the Public Relations Society of America, see
New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 9, 1964, p. 31.
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complaints could then be handled before an administrative tribunal subject
to judicial review. The major accomplishment of such a system would be
its ability to provide adequate remedies. Private causes of action could be
brought for damages as well as injunctive relief, without the limitations
inherent in the laws designed to prevent manipulation and fraud; the
Commission could also obtain quick equitable relief.
Finally, although this problem is covered in other areas of the Special
Study,171 it seems imperative that the post-issuance disclosure requirements
not be limited to securities listed on the national exchanges, but also apply
to certain securities traded in the over-the-counter market. The opportunity to mislead the public exists in both markets.

III. INVESTMENT ADVICE
When an investor asks the question, "What stock should I buy?" there
are many people who will give him an answer, ranging from fly-by-night
"tipsheet" publishers to highly competent personal investment counselors.
Some will give him the answer gratis, but with the hope that when he does
buy he will avail himself of their brokerage services. From others, the advice
will be forthcoming for the price of a subscription fee. If the investor
prefers personalized service, and his investment capital is sufficient to
qualify him for such benefits, the fee for advice will be based on a percentage of the money invested.172 There are still other advisers who will not
wait for the potential investor to pose his inquiry; rather, they expound
their views regarding investment, for public consumption, in newspapers,
magazines, and books. All these persons are referred to generally as "investment advisers." Still, the list would not be complete without the addition
of a large and indefinable group composed of lawyers, accountants, insurance companies, banks, and all others who may be in a position to convey
investment advice.173 Taken as a whole, the advice thus disseminated has
great influence on the private investor and, in turn, on the entire securities
market. It is the purpose of this section to point out the significant problems presented by the continual flow of investment information, to discuss
the legal and ethical responsibilities of the advisers, to evaluate present
controls in the area, and to offer some suggestions as to improved solutions
to the problems presented.
Id. at 1-64.
Personal investment advice and management tends to be out of the price range
of the average investor. For instance, Lehman Brothers limits its investment advisory
service to clients with $400,000 or more to invest. Generally, the fee for personal investment advice amounts to one half of one percent of the money invested. See MAYER,
WA.IL STREET: MEN AND MoNEY 195 (2d ed. 1959).
173 Although a well-placed magazine or newspaper obviously can affect the price of
a stock, recommendations of this kind have far less effect on the investing public
than the recommendations of those in the business of disseminating investment advice.
See Special Study pt. 1, at 332. The material below will be directed toward analysis of
the problems stemming from the activity of the latter group.
171
172
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A. Present Regulation of Investment Advice
I. Federal Regulation

The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was passed as Title II of the bill
of which Title I was the Investment Company Act.174 Its passage followed
a report on investment advisers in which the Commission described the
growth of the investment advisory business and pointed out the more obvious problems involved in it.1711 The significant portions of the act required
registration of investment advisers with the Commission; prohibited fraud
or deceit in dealings with a client or prospective client; forbade investment
advisory contracts providing for compensation to the adviser on the basis
of capital gains from, or appreciation of, securities purchased; prohibited
assignment of advisory contracts by the adviser without the consent of the
party advised; and required that the adviser give full disclosure when selling or purchasing securities for a client while at the same time acting on
the other side of the transaction as principal for his own account or agent
for one other than the client.176 The term "investment adviser" as defined
in section 202(a)(II) of the act means any person who, for compensation,
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and
as a part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities.177 "Investment adviser" does not include: (a) a bank
or holding company affiliate which is not an investment company; (b) a
lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of such services
is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (c) a broker-dealer
whose performance of such services is incidental to the conduct of his
business and who receives no compensation therefor; (d) publishers of
newspapers, news magazines, and business and financial publications of
regular and general circulation; (e) those persons whose advice is confined
to obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States;
and (f) any other persons so designated by the Commission.178 The following investment advisers are exempted from the registration requirements
of the act: (1) an investment adviser whose clients are residents of the state
of his business, and who does not furnish advice with respect to any
security traded on a national exchange; (2) an investment adviser whose
only clients are investment companies and insurance companies; and (3)
an investment adviser who in the preceding twelve months had less than
11• 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963).
1711 SEC, INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY,
AND

INVESTMENT .ADVISORY SERVICES {1939).

176 Investment Advisers Act §§ 203, 205-08, 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 80b-3, 80b-5 to -8 (1958 & Supp. IV, 1963).
177 Investment Advisers Act § 202{a){ll), 54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1958).
178 Ibid.
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fifteen clients and did not hold himself out to the public as an investment
adviser.179
Professor Loss has deemed the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 "little
more than a continuing census of the Nation's investment advisers in this
country." 180 This observation is substantiated by the fact that proceedings
under the act sin.ce its promulgation in 1940 have averaged one or two per
year,181 and that these actions have been largely confined to the most
blatant types of fraud. 182 The deficiencies in the act have not gone unnoticed by the Commission. As early as 1945 the Commission formally
urged improvement of the act.183 Prior to the passage of the bill amending
the act in 1960, a congressional committee noted that, of the five acts administered by the Commission, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was by
far the least adequate to meet the problems it was supposed to solve.18 4
In fact, the amendments to the act were the only part of the Commission's
legislative program which, at that time, was supported without dissent in
the industry.185
The 1960 amendments gave the Commission additional grounds for
denial of registration to an applicant.186 In order to facilitate adequate investigation of potential registrants, the Commission was given the power
to postpone the effectiveness of the initial registration.187 Previously, the
Commission was required to decide within thirty days whether to approve
the application for registration.188 Moreover, with respect to advisers already registered under the act, the Commission can now suspend registration for a period not to exceed twelve months.189 Prior to 1960 the only
disciplinary tool possessed by the Commission was outright revocation of
registration.190 Of course, an unregistered adviser is for all practical pur110 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1958).
180 2 Loss 1393.
181 Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 248 (1959).
182 For instance, in the fiscal year 1961 there were two proceedings brought by the
Commission under the act. In one, the registration of an investment adviser who solicited
and accepted money for subscriptions to an investment letter, but did not publish it, was
revoked. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 108, Oct. 4, 1960. In the other, the
Commission revoked the registration of an investment adviser who had simultaneously
violated the fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963), and § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 54 Stat.
852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. IV, 1963), relating to perpetration of
fraud on a client. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 109, Oct. 31, 1960.
183 SEC, PROTECTION OF CLIENTS SECURlTIES AND FUNDS IN THE CUSTODY OF INVEST!\IBNT
ADVISERS (1945).
184 S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
185 Ibid.
186 Investment Advisers Act § 203(b), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b·
3(d) (Supp. IV, 1963).
187 Investment Advisers Act § 203(e), 54 Stat. 851 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b3(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
188 54 Stat. 851 (1940).
189 Investment Advisers Act § 203(d), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(d) (Supp. IV, 1963).
190 54 Stat. 851 (1940).

•

1964]

COMMENTS

719

poses out of business, as he is permitted to use neither the mails nor any
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with his advisory
business. 191 It is apparent that the harshness of the revocation penalty precluded disciplinary action by the Commission in instances in which a
penalty of some lesser degree would have been appropriate. 192 The Commission now has the power to require the keeping of books and records,193
and to require the filing of reports by investment advisers. 194 A complementary provision forbids public disclosure of information obtained by the
Commission in examination or investigation, except in the case of public
hearings or upon request by Congress. 195 In short, the Commission staff is
placed under a duty of nondisclosure similar to that of a bank examiner.
By far the most important provision of the 1960 amendments is that empowering the Commission to define "fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative" practices and to prescribe by rules means reasonably designed to
prevent them. 196 The wording of this section is almost identical to section
15(c)(2) of the Exchange Act, which relates to broker-dealers.197
With the passage of the 1960 amendments to the Investment Advisers
Act, only two of the major proposals concerning investment advisers suggested by the Commission since 1945 remain unenacted: an amendment to
section 205 of the act, requiring advisory contracts of registered advisers to
be in writing, and the addition of a section prohibiting a registered adviser
from having custody of his client's securities or funds unless his registration
application discloses that he had or might have such custody. 198 Considering the revelations of the Special Study, 199 it is doubtful that either of these
proposals will receive sufficient attention to become law. It is apparent that
far more prevalent and serious deficiencies exist in other areas of investor
protection. Furthermore, it appears that the Commission, through the use
of its new rule-making power, has provided sufficient protection for an
investor whose securities and funds are in the hands of an investment
adviser.
To date, the Commission has issued three sets of regulations pursuant
to the rule-making power given it by the 1960 amendments. First, the ComInvestment Advisers Act § 203(a), 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1958).
For instance, two advisers were permitted to remain in business although the firm
they controlled had been found guilty of taking secret profits at customers' expense and
of willfully falsifying its registration statement. H. Evan Taylor, 26 S.E.C. 637 (1947).
103 Investment Advisers Act § 204, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4
(Supp. IV, 1963).
104 Ibid.
105 Investment Advisers Act § 210, 54 Stat. 854 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10
(Supp. IV, 1963). There are no similar nondisclosure provisions relating to investigations
under other acts administered by the Commission.
100 Investment Advisers Act § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(Supp. IV, 1963).
107 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (1958).
108 See SEC, PROTECTION OF CLIENTS SECURITIES AND FUNDS IN THE CUSTODY OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS (1945).
100 See generally Special Study pt. 1, at 330-479.
101
102
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mission has formulated an extensive list of records which must be kept by
every investment adviser.200 These include: memoranda setting forth the
details of any transaction or instruction relating to the sale or purchase of
any security; bills or statements relating to the business of the investment
adviser; and originals of communications received and sent with regard to
recommendations or advice proposed or made, exchanges of securities, and
buy and sell orders. Second, the Commission has promulgated rulings dealing with advertisements by investment advisors. 201 Any testimonial relating
to the adviser is prohibited. Reference to past recommendations which
would have proved profitable is likewise prohibited. The adviser, however,
may list his recommendations within one year of the advertisement if there
is printed on the first page of the advertisement, the following words: "It
should not be assumed that the recommendations made in the future will
be profitable or will equal the performance of the securities in this list."
The regulation also provides, in effect, that there can be no claim that a
chart or graph will predict the future of a stock. Third, the Commission
has promulgated rules concerning the adviser's possession of his clients
funds or securities. It is deemed a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
practice for any investment adviser to take action with regard to his client's
funds or securities unless the adviser (1) segregates, identifies, and holds
such funds or securities in a reasonably safe place; (2) deposits all funds in
a bank account or accounts containing only the client's funds, maintained
in the name of the adviser as agent or trustee, and keeps adequate records
of such accounts; (3) gives notice to the client of the location of the funds
and securities; (4) sends each such client an itemized statement at least every
three months showing the funds or securities in the adviser's custody, and
all debits, credits, and transactions affecting the client's account during such
period; and (5) provides for verification of funds and securities of the client
by an independent public accountant, without notice to the adviser, at
least once a year.202 However, this regulation does not apply to an investment adviser also registered as a broker-dealer under section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if the broker-dealer is in compliance with
or exempt from section 15c(3)(1).2os
The impact of the new regulations is readily apparent. Since the three
sets of rules were promulgated, the registrations of investment advisers
have been revoked in eight cases, and three proceedings have been instituted
to revoke the registrations of others.204 The regulations have opened the door
200 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
201 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
202 27 Fed. Reg. 2150 (March 6, 1962).
203 Ibid. The regulation of investment advice given by broker-dealers is given further
attention in section IV infra.
204 Revocations: SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 153, Nov. 26, 1963 Gustin
Stone & Associates, Inc.); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 148, Sept. 4, 1963
(Dynamics Letter, Inc.); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 134, Dec. 31, 1962
(J. H. Logan & Co.); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 130, Oct. 4, 1962 (Seymour
J. Schlesinger); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 128, June 20, 1962 (Carroll Till-
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to aggressive policing of investment advisers-a course not available before
1960. For instance, in the proceeding which resulted in the revocation of
the registrations of Carroll Tillman and Francis Ryan,205 doing business as
the Tillman Survey, the Commission charged that Tillman, aided and
abetted by Ryan, published and distributed advertising material which
contained untrue statements and which was false and misleading. Among
other infractions, the misrepresentations in the advertisements consisted of
comparisons between the securities recommended by Tillman and other
securities, without adequate disclosure of the material differences between
the securities, and representations that a list of ten stocks presented was
selected in accordance with seven tests prescribed by Tillman, which tests
could allegedly uncover enormously profitable securities.

2. State Regulation
State regulation of investment advisers is a comparatively recent development, although there is a noticeable trend in this direction.206 In 1958,
sixteen states required the registration of investment advisers; 207 by 1962,
the number had risen to twenty-five.208 However, according to a survey of
the twenty-five states requiring adviser registration, in only sixteen can the
security commission or other appropriate officer deny registration to those
applicants he considers unqualified.209 Thus, in a little over one-fourth of
the states requiring registration, it is but a mere formality.
The relevant provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1956,
are integrated with similar provisions relating to broker-dealers. Section
102 of the Uniform Act, dealing with investment advice, is analogous to
the Investment Advisers Act, as amended in 1960. Unlike the federal
statute, however, the Uniform Act requires that the investment advisory
contract be at least in part in writing. 210 The Uniform Act also gives the
administrator the power to deny, suspend, or revoke an application for
registration if he feels the applicant or registrant is not qualified on the
basis of such factors as training, experience, and knowledge of the securities
man and Francis Ryan); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 127, June 12, 1962
(Anne Casely Robin, doing business as The Profit Maker); SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 129, June 9, 1962 (Owen K. Taylor, Inc., Edward Blatt, Walter Rosenbusch,
and Financial Forecasters, Inc.); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 126, June 5,
1962 (William H. Biesel). The following proceedings were instituted under the Investment Advisers Act to determine whether the registrations of certain investment advisers
should be revoked: SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 151, Oct. 30, 1963 (Spear
&: Staff, Inc.); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 144, May 8, 1963 (Paul K. Peers,
Inc.); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 139, March 25, 1963 (Market Values, Inc.).
205 Investment Advisers Act Release No. 128, June 20, 1962 (ordering the revocation
of the registrations of Carroll Tillman and Francis Ryan).
206 See Loss &: CowEIT, BLUE SKY LAW 20-21 (1958).
201 Ibid.
20s 1 Loss 47.
209 Id. at 48-49.
210 UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 102(b).
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business.211 In contrast, there are no provisions in the federal act allowing
the Commission to deny or revoke a registration due to lack of ability of
the adviser. Moreover, the Uniform Act provides that the administrator
may require a minimum capital figure for broker-dealers and investment
advisers. 212 To date, the Uniform Securities Act has been adopted in fifteen
states and is expected to become law in several others.2 1a

3. Self-Regulation
Private associations of investment advisers play a minimal role in selfregulation. Presently, there are two such groups organized on a nation-wide
basis. The Investment Counsel Association of America (ICAA) is an organization of fifty-four firms "primarily engaged in the giving of continuous advice as to the investment of funds of clients on the basis of the
individual needs of each client."214 The Institute of Chartered Financial
Analysts was formed in 1959 with the objective of fostering higher educational standards in the field of financial analysis by conducting examinations designed to test individual competence and skill. The Institute grants
the designation of "chartered financial analyst" to persons who meet the
standards established by the Institute for the professional practice of
financial analysis.215 The Special Study noted that both the Institute and
the ICAA have embarked on a course aimed ultimately at "achieving professional recognition, much in the manner of accountants, whose drive for
recognition started at the end of the nineteenth century."216 Although it
would seem that such a program might indirectly lead to a general raising
of industry standards, the Study reported that the present program seems
to hold only limited benefits for the public, as the immediate result will be
confined to the conferring of an industry cachet upon certain analysts.217
The small size of these organizations, the absence of substantial sanctions
against their members, and the present focus on "status" rather than control of industry practices, all combine to render their effect de minimis.
The New York Stock Exchange has established certain guideposts for
advisory material disseminated by member firms. It suggests that supporting
information be offered with respect to recommendations relating to the
sale or purchase of securities; that forecasts of future performance be clearly
labeled as opinion; and that flamboyant language and misleading comparisons be avoided.218 The NYSE has also suggested that a member organiId. § 204{b)(6).
Id. § 202(d).
Special Study pt. 1, at 82. The following states have adopted the Uniform Securities
Act: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and ·washington.
214 !CAA by-laws art. 1, § 1, as quoted in Special Study pt. 1, at 149. It is obvious that
this association encompasses a very small percentage of the 1,836 advisers registered
under the Investment Advisers Act.
215 special Study pL 1, at 149.
216 Id. at 150.
217 Ibid.
218 Quoted in Special Study pt. 1, at 376-77.
211
212
213
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zation recommending a security in which it has a position should consider
whether such an interest ought not to be stated in the material. The Special
Study, however, reported that if most firms "consider" including a statement of their position, the results of such consideration "appear almost
universally to be negative." 219 Furthermore, the Study reported that most
firms pay little heed to any of the afore-mentioned guideposts.220 The NYSE
also has a program for review of market letters and sales literature, which
is reported to be "considerably short of vigorous and aggressive self-regulation."221 Similarly, the NASD has certain general restrictions on advice
published by broker-dealers, the enforcement of which is equally uninspiring.222 Since few advisory firms are engaged in selling, advisers are for the
most part beyond the compass of the NYSE and NASD rules.

B. Present Problems and Recommended Solutions
Aside from the problems relating to the qualifications of investment
advisers, the Special Study indicated that, from the point of view of protection of the average investor, the present major deficiencies in the opera-tion of advisers relate to (I) the widespread practice of "scalping," i.e., the
adviser has a position in a particular stock, recommends investor action in
that stock, and after market response to his recommendation, sells or buys
accordingly, reaping gains from the market action that he has generated;
(2) the problem of "snowballing" recommendations, i.e., an adviser recommends a stock in his publication, whereupon another writing his market
letter on the basis of the first recommends the same stock even more
vigorously, and so on; (3) inadequate research practices; and (4) the predominant orientation toward "buy" recommendations-both in brokerdealer literature and that disseminated by the subscription services.
At the time the Report of the Special Study was published, it was doubtful whether the practice of scalping was in fact proscribed by the Invest210

Id. at 377.

220 Ibid.
221 Id. at 379. In response to criticism by the Report of the Special Study, the NYSE
recently issued an expanded set of rules governing member firms' market letters, research
reports, and other communications with the investor. Among the more significant of the
new rules are the following: (1) a tighter requirement that member firms recommending
securities in market letters disclose their own dealings in the issues; (2) a provision requiring
that member firm claims that they are equipped to provide research facilities have a reasonable basis; (3) a requirement that reports and recommendations prepared by someone other
than the brokerage firm (such as a company's public relations agent) identify the source;
(4) a requirement that brokerage firms' internal wires and market letters conform to the
rules for market letters shown to the public; and (5) a requirement that a firm's recommendation to buy or sell a stock have a basis which can be substantiated as reasonable.
These new rules were reported in The Wall Street J., Sept. 25, 1963, p. 9, col. 2. One must
remember, however, that the Special Study's criticism was directed toward the lack of
enforcement of exchange rules rather than the lack of rules; thus, whether the present
action of the NYSE is indicative of a policy that will in fact meet the objections of the
Special Study remains to be seen.
222 See Comment, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REv. 827 (1962).
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ment Advisers Act. However, in the recent case of SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc. 223 the United States Supreme Court held that the
practice of "scalping" is in fact a form of fraud or deceit on the client and
as such within the practices forbidden by the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940. In five instances Capital Gains had acquired a position in certain
issues and then recommended that its customers purchase the same securities,
each time without disclosing its position in the market or its intention to
sell. It then sold the securities it held at a considerable profit.
In investigating the problem of scalping, the Study found no consistent
attitude on the part of advisory firms toward the propriety of recommending securities in which the firm is disposing of its position, or toward the
necessity of disclosing that it has a position.224 Some firms stated that they
will not solicit purchases by their public customers of a security in which
they are liquidating an investment position, while others will not prepare
a market letter or research report on such a security.225 On the other hand,
many firms do not disclose their position in the securities which they
recommend, and some even ask their adviser-salesmen to "crank up on it
as . . . very attractive" when they are trying to "unload."226 The Special
Study recommended, with respect to advisers and broker-dealers subject to
self-regulatory organizations, that thorough statements of policy standards
be established requiring disclosure of existing positions in written investment advice.227 With regard to those not subject to self-regulation, the
Study recommended organization into self-regulatory bodies, or alternatively that the Commission extend and strengthen its own regulatory measures,228 with the same objectives in mind. However, it would seem futile
to hope for the emergence of a self-regulatory body or bodies in the near
future, as the investment advisory business has flourished since the end of
World War I with no significant move in this direction. Furthermore, the
wide variations of opinion on the part of those in the field with respect to
ethical standards would certainly make it difficult for such a body to form
a meaningful set of rules. Disclosure of the adviser's position seems definitely preferable to a total prohibition from taking a position, as an advisory_broker-dealer firm may legitimately want to build up a position in a stock
which it is about to recommend, in order to have shares available for its
223 84 Sup. Ct. 275 (1963). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had refused to
find Capital Gains guilty of wrongdoing under the fraud section of the Investment
Advisers Act, stating that, at most, the defendant merely profited personally from the
predictable effect of its investment advice; however, there was a vigorous dissenting
opinion, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), 61 MICH.
L. REv. 1185 (1963).
224 special Study pt. 1, at 371.
225 Id. at 371-73.
220 Ibid.
227 Id. at 386.
22s Id. at 387.
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customers at a price which will not reflect the market impact of its recommendation. A disclosure rule promulgafed by the Commission would seem
the most appropriate remedy. Specifically, under section 206(4) of the
Investment Advisers Act, as amended in 1960,229 the Commission should
define nondisclosure of one's position as deceptive or manipulative and
require full disclosure of the adviser's position in any security which he
recommends.
The matter of "snowballing" recommendations is but one aspect of a
more general problem relating to inadequate research. If there were adequate research departments in all of the advisory firms who claim to have
them, recommendations could in fact be based on the firm's independent
evaluation of each company with which it deals, and there would be no
need for "cribbing" and using other advisory letters for source material.
The Dunn Engineering case,280 reported in detail by the Special Study,
presents a graphic illustration of the disastrous effects of this phenomenon.
In this case, a chain reaction of various market letters, each based at least
in part on a previous letter, resulted in the enthusiastic recommendation
of Dunn Engineering by broker-dealers and subscription publishers within
a few weeks of its bankruptcy, long after the appearance of obvious signs
that the company was in bad trouble.
The Special Study reported several examples of wholly inadequate researching of recommended securities.281 Most unfortunate was the finding
that "frequently there is a broad gap between the practices followed and
the standards professed to the public."282 The most significant shortcoming
with respect to advice disseminated by broker-dealers is that research staffs
are often so burdened with preparing internal publications, answering individual inquiries, providing portfolio reviews, and working on special
advisory services for institutional investors that there is insufficient time
to devote to material for investors generally.233 The prime shortcoming
of subscription publication research is that the publications attempt to
cover far more securities than their staffs can adequately evaluate.234 The
brunt of inadequate research, in the form of ill-prepared market letters
and tout sheets of broker-dealers, is borne by the small investor; it was he
who was hardest hit in the 1962 downturn of the market.235 Institutional
220 That section provides: "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of
the mails or any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly
••• (4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative. The Commission shall for the purpose of this paragraph (4) by rules
and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts,
practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Investment Advisers Act § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. IV,
1963).
2so Special Study pt. 1, at 334-44.
231 Id. at 351-53.
282 Id. at 350.
288 Ibid.
284 Id. at 363-67.
285 U.S. News &: World Report, Oct. 1, 1962, pp. 56-59.
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investors generally pay for and receive priority treatment with regard to
research skill and investment advice.236 The Special Study has recommended
that reckless dissemination of investment advice by broker-dealers and
investment advisers be expressly prohibited by statute or rules of the
Commission and the self-regulatory agencies. The most adequate remedy
would be Commission rules prohibiting reckless dissemination of investment
advice. The Commission has the authority to promulgate such rules by
virtue of its power under both the Exchange Act and the Investment
Advisers Act to prohibit "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices.23611
A market letter or report appearing or stated to be the product of research
when in fact it is not is obviously "deceptive." It is apparent that the
Commission, by a broad interpretation of the fraud section of the Securities
Exchange Act, is attempting to protect the investor from similarly deceptive
representations coming from broker-dealers in connection with the offer
and sale of securities. For instance, in the case of Brown, Barton, and
Engel237 the Commission suspended the broker-dealer registration in question on the basis of sections IO(b) and 15(c)(l) of the Securities Exchange
Act.238 The respondent had made false and misleading representations with
respect to future prices, listings, and availability of certain stock. Additionally, he failed to make a diligent and reasonable investigation of the
issuer before recommending the stock. The Commission felt that suspension
of the registration was necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
The detrimental effect of unreliable investment advice is the same
whether attendant to an offer to sell securities or part of a market report of
an investment adviser; in either case, the investor is led to act on representations purportedly the product of an accurate evaluation, when in fact no
such evaluation has taken place. The rules suggested would effectuate the
degree of investor protection toward which the Commission was striving
in the Brown case, but at the same time would expand its compass to include all advice disseminated by both broker-dealers and investment advisers. The flexibility of the rules is both desirable and necessary. Aside
from the fact that definite standards would be hard to formulate, flexible
rules would be more in keeping with the fact that informal, behind-thescenes conferences play a significant part in Commission supervision, and
236 Special Study pt.
286a Exchange Act §

1, at 357.
15(c)(2), 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1958); Investment
Advisers Act § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b·6 (Supp. IV, 1963).
237 Brown, Barton &: Engel, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6821, June
8, 1962.
238 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963). The
composite effect of these provisions and the rules enacted thereunder is to make unlawful
the use of the mails or the facilities of interstate commerce in connection with the purchase or sale of any security by means of a scheme to defraud, any untrue or misleading
statement of a material fact, or any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon customers, or by means of any other manip•
ulative, deceptive, or fraudulent device.
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would allow the Commission to draw upon its experience in enforcing the
analogous general fraud section of the Securities Exchange Act.
Whether restrained and dignified or exuberant and flamboyant, whether
distributed by broker-dealers or advisers, the tone of most investment advice
points to one course of action: BUY.239 This fact would not be disturbing in itself if it were not coupled with a great difference of opinion in
the securities industry as to the extent of a firm's obligation to make the
recipients of its published advice aware of significant changes in the circumstances of a company whose security it has recommended.240 Although
one firm reporting to the Special Study group suggested that there may
be a moral obligation to follow up recommendations and give periodic reports until a sell recommendation is made, most firms indicated that no
organized effort is made to follow up on stock favorably recommended.241
There are several reasons why advisory firms don't want to give "sell"
advice. First, such advice can result in refusal by management of the
issuer of the "unrecommended" security to continue as a source of information for the adviser. A few firms feel that problems would be created
by customers who might receive the advice late.242 Most important, the
ominous possibility of losing underwriting business as a result of management's adverse reaction is ever-present for firms who do underwriting as
well as disseminate investment advice. Nevertheless, these rationalizations
do not compensate for the fact that, in purporting to act for the investor
in giving advice concerning the investor's portfolio, the investment adviser
has assumed a position tantamount to, if not actually that of a fiduciary.
Logic, as well as reasonable business morality, dictates that "sell" recommendations be forthcoming when the market so warrants. A call for legislation or regulation would not seem to be the answer to this deficiency,
for innumerable problems, including those presented by the first amendment, would result from an attempt to formulate a regulation in any way
delineating the substantive content of securities literature. In this light, it
seems that the best "remedy" for the problem is cultivation of public
awareness of the prevailing orientation toward "buy" recommendations.
The report of the Special Study is in itself a step in the right direction.
Once the investing public is aware of the fact that the prime concern of
advisers is to sell securities, there should be far less misplaced reliance on
the judgment of advisers.
A significant problem tangentially related to a discussion of investment
advisers per se is that of unreasonable and collusively set advisory fees paid
by mutual funds to investment advisers. Although this problem was not
dealt with by the Special Study, it has been the subject of several recent
cases litigated under the Investment Company Act. The following pattern
2so
240
241
242

Special Study pt. I, at 344-50.
Id. at 348.
Ibid.
special Study pt. I, at 348.
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is usually present in these cases. The directors of the adviser are also the
directors of the fund and are therefore able to fix the fees in the interest
of the adviser rather than the fund. Thus the resultant advisory fee bears
no relation to the reasonable value of the services rendered; and although
there are poor results, the advisory contract is consistently renewed.243
The Investment Company Act has adequate standards to gauge the fiduciary conduct of those directors of mutual funds who play such a dual role,
and the Commission has the power to step in.244 The question presented
in the recent cases, however, relates to whether a mutual fund or shareholder thereof suing for breach of fiduciary duty has a private right of
action by virtue of the Investment Company Act. An affirmative answer
would supply much needed uniformity in the field. Without such a private right of action, a plaintiff is left to his common-law remedy, which of
course depends on the laws of the various states. The federal courts are
presently split on the question. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, refusing to hold that a private remedy stems by implication from the
Investment Company Act, has indicated that in a private action the directors of a mutual fund are to be held to their common-law duty of due
care, rather than the fiduciary standards articulated in the act-with respect to advisory fees or otherwise.245 On the other hand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has allowed a private right of action based on the
alleged violation of eight different sections of the Investment Company
Act, in which the plaintiffs sought to have the advisory contracts declared
null and void, and to have the individual defendants repay the excessive
advisory fees. 246 In the course of its opinion, the Court expressly rejected
the Eighth Circuit's restrictive interpretation of the Investment Company
Act.
Because the Investment Advisers Act was until 1960 a weaker regulatory
device than the Investment Company Act, the Securities Act, and the Exchange Act, there are no reported cases in which a plaintiff has successfully recovered damages from an adviser by virtue of its provisions. The
aggrieved investor's chances may be somewhat better since the act was
strengthened by the 1960 amendments. Nevertheless, because most federal
courts which have implied liability from the other federal securities acts
have required buyer-seller privity247-a condition almost always lacking in
a suit against an investment adviser-it seems that plaintiffs will remain
dependent upon the common-law remedy: an action for deceit. Still,
the possibility of a civil remedy for a plaintiff aggrieved by an investment
243 For a general discussion of this problem, see Comment, Private Rights of Action
Under the Investment Company Act, 1961 DuKE L.J. 421.
244 See generally Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963).
245 Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 918 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot,
369 U.S. 424 (1962).
246 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
247 Comment, supra note 222, at 837.
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adviser should not be completely foreclosed. It is settled that an action
for damages can be based on the Securities Exchange Act, which makes it
unlawful to use a manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.248 Similar language was added to the Investment Advisers Act in 1960, and if one regards the investment adviser as
a fiduciary, the fiduciary relationship should compensate for the lack of
buyer-seller privity, at least in cases where the investor has paid for personal service or a subscription publication. The Special Study recommended that, by statute or rule, the reckless dissemination of investment
advice be expressly made subject to civil liability in favor of customers
reasonably relying thereon to their detriment.249 However, this recommendation seems premature. The enactment of such a rule should await
an authoritative ruling from a federal court to the effect that a civil liability cannot be implied from the Investment Advisers Act, as amended in
1960. Moreover, from the point of view of the general public, the Commission would be better off for the time being concentrating its efforts
in the direction of adequate control to prevent deceptive practices from
occurring at all.
C. Conclusion

Insofar as there is to be state regulation and/or registration of investment advisers, it should be part of the general state Blue Sky law and not
be made the subject of separate legislation. There are several advantages of
integrated Blue Sky legislation. If all aspects of legislation dealing with
broker-dealers and investment advisers were part of a single legislative
enactment, rather than piecemeal statutory rules, the adoption of uniform
legislation among the states would be facilitated. Clear legislative statements of state policy would aid federal-state coordination in developing
this area of the law. Furthermore, within each state, requirements of dual
registration when a person is both a broker-dealer and an investment adviser would be eliminated, and economy and consistency in the administration of securities laws would be enhanced by a single set of provisions
relating to rule-making, investigation, enforcement, and analogous procedures. But, on the whole, state action seems inadequate to cope with
the problems presented by the investment adviser segment of the securities
industry. The flow of advisory material is obviously interstate, and investor
material of general circulation from a single source will reach most of the
states. Most important, however, is the fact that the United States has a
direct interest in maintaining the integrity of the securities markets, which
play a vital role in the national economy.
On a nationwide basis, the assumption of more responsibility by existing self-regulatory organizations, the formation of self-regulatory organizations where there are none, the promulgation of regulations requiring
248

240

Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
Special Study pt. I, at 387.
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disclosure of the adviser's position in securities he recommends, the prohibition of reckless dissemination of investment information, and provision
for a civil remedy for those hurt by reckless advice would provide more
adequate protection for the investor. Yet, more than this seems to be required to raise the investment advice business to a high ethical plane and
the level of professional competence it often professes to embody. Those
in the advisory field will have to decide whether they are salesmen peddling their commodity-investment advice-for whatever it is worth, or
professional men willing to assume a fiduciary responsibility in the selection and supervision of suitable investment portfolios. Only the latter
answer will fully protect the investor from the undesirable results of the
present predominant orientation of advisory material toward "buy" recommendations-a problem that seemingly cannot be solved by legislation
or regulation. Whatever the results of the Special Study in the way of
immediate legislation or rules, it seems that its most significant accomplishment in this sphere of the securities industry is that it has publicly posed
the basic questions, and thereby set the stage for comprehensive government control of the field if the industry itself does not provide adequate
solutions.
IV.

SELLING PRACTICES

No examination of present-day selling practices in the securities industry can be limited merely to coverage of the Special Study findings and

recommendations. In the area of selling practices, far more than in the
three preceding sections, the courts and particularly the Commission itself
have on their own initiative recently instituted sweeping and sometimes
dramatic changes. Many of these alterations in the level of professional
integrity required of the broker-dealer have transpired within recent
months. The Special Study recommendations must be viewed in the light
of these developments. Thus this section will devote as much attention to
recent proceedings in the courts and the Commission as to the Study itself.
The merchandising of securities is a multimillion dollar industry which
has come to play an integral part in the American economy.250 The number of individuals owning shares in publicly held corporations in 1962 was
estimated to be about 17,010,000, an increase of approximately 4,500,000
since 1959.251 This rapid growth has been largely the result of an increased
emphasis on sales techniques; and, because of his direct contact with the
public, the activity of the securities salesman is critical to the sales effort.252
The intangible nature of securities and the intricacies of the securities
business as a whole present formidable obstacles to knowledgeable invest250 The market value of the shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange alone in
1962 was $47 billion. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1963 FACT BOOK I (8th ed. April, 1963).
251 Of these 17,010,000 persons, 6,666,000 had household incomes under $7,500, and
the adult female shareholders outnumbered the adult male shareholders by 326,000. Ibid.
252 special Study pt. 1, at 250.
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ment. As a result, the public must ordinarily rely heavily upon the advice
and recommendation of the securities salesman, regardless of whether the
salesman acts as agent or principal in the sale. Such reliance sets the stage
for great potentialities for fraud, and it has been observed that "the business of trading in securities is one in which opportunities for dishonesty
are of constant recurrence and ever present. It engages acute, active minds,
trained to quick apprehension, decision, and action.'' 253 The laws governing selling practices attempt to resolve the conflict between policies favoring traditional arm's-length transactions protected by the doctrine of caveat
emptor, and the realities of public investment-a dependent relationship
lacking many of the safeguards of the bargaining process.
A distinction between a securities broker and a securities dealer has
developed as a part of the law of selling practices. Traditionally, their
functions were separate, with the broker selling and buying as agent "for"
his customer, and the dealer, acting as a principal, selling "to" and buying
"from" his customer. With the advent of federal securities regulation, the
functions of broker and dealer received separate legislative treatment,
although the courts had previously recognized these distinctions and had
employed certain differentiating characteristics to distinguish the dealer
from the agent. 254 The Securities Act of 1933 included within the definition
of dealer those who perform the functions of a broker,255 but the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 distinguished between the two, defining a broker as
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others," 256 and a dealer as "any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a
broker or otherwise ... :•251
The inconsistency inherent in a situation where the same firm or individual acts as both agent and principal has long been recognized. Nevertheless, the practice of combining these functions is prevalent throughout
the securities industry, and almost universal in the over-the-counter market.
In a 1936 report of the Securities and Exchange Commission it was stated
Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943).
See Douglas &: Bates, Stock "Brokers" As Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46
(1933). "Other courts have recognized ••• distinctions and in general have employed the
following differentiating characteristics or earmarks to distinguish the dealer from the
agent.
"(l) The form of the confirmation 'sold to you' rather than 'bought for your account'
is evidentiary of a dealer-customer relationship.
"(2) The fact that the customer is not charged any commission is likewise evidence
that the 'broker' acted as dealer.
"(3) The 'broker' when acting as a dealer usually acquires the stock at one price and
transfers it to the customer at another.
"(4) If the 'broker' is selling from his inventory he is acting as a dealer.
"(5) He is nonetheless a dealer even though he had no inventory but was acquiring
securities for his customer in the manner of any merchant." Id. at 60-61.
255 Section 2(12), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l2) (1958).
256 Section 3(a)(4), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1958).
257 Section 3(a)(5), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1958).
258
254
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that the combination of the broker and dealer functions in the same individual or firm involves a conflict of interest provocative of abuse of the
fiduciary relationship inherent in the brokerage function. 258 It was found,
however, that separation of the functions was so often economically unfeasible in smaller communities that the solution for this conflict was not
to divorce the functions, but to control conflicts of interest by a strong
administrative program of inspection and control.259 One result of the
program undertaken by the Commission subsequent to this report has been
the virtual elimination of the distinction between broker and dealer, accomplished by application of a standard of fair dealing to all sales practices. Furthermore, the distinction between broker and dealer may now
be illusory, since it is doubtful that the word "dealer" conveys the idea of
an arm's-length relationship to the average customer or even to the trade.200
This is true because of the broad definition used in the Securities Act, and
because an agent may have a declared interest adverse to that of his principal in the very transaction to which the agency relates.261 Whatever the
reasons, distinctions between the two are generally ignored in the area of
selling practices; and the Commission has adopted the inclusive designation "broker-dealer."202
The investor gains some protection against fraudulent selling practices
of broker-dealers by virtue of the remedies provided by traditional commonlaw actions, such as deceit and rescission. Further protection has been
found in an implied civil cause of action based on the Exchange Act of
1934.263 The anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities acts, violation of
which may subject a broker or dealer to civil, criminal, and administrative
sanctions imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, provide
specific protection for the investor. Finally, the national exchanges and
the NASD have their own disciplinary proceedings designed to deal with
fraudulent selling practices.
The material below examines the law as it exists today governing the
fraudulent selling of securities,264 the sanctions available against violators,
the remedies available to a defrauded investor, and findings and conclusions of the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets.
258 SEC, REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF
THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 109 (1936).
259 Id. at 110-13.
260 See generally Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers
in Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1237, 1248 n.45 (1946).
261 REsrATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 23, 24, 389, 390 (1958).
262 See generally 2 Loss, 1215-23; 3 id. at 1500-08. Hereinafter the functions will be
treated as combined, unless otherwise indicated.
263 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
264 Excluded from this examination are those activities which do not involve direct
contact with the public, e.g., odd-lot houses, specialists, floor-traders, and pure wholesale
dealers.
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A. Laws Governing the Fraudulent Selling of Securities
Prior to 1933, the federal government could combat fraudulent selling
practices only by bringing criminal charges under the mail fraud statute.265
The Securities Act of 1933, however, embodied a general provision declaring fraudulent practices unlawful when connected with the offer or
sale of any security.266 This provision, section 17(a), has provided the
basic language for all subsequent antifraud provisions:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly
or indirectly-(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."26 7
The Exchange Act of 1934 included section IO(b), which made unlawful
use of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of Commission rules" in the purchase or sale of any security whether
registered on a national securities exchange or not.268 Pursuant to this
section, the Commission adopted Rule IOb-5, incorporating the language
of section 17(a), but making it applicable to both the purchase and sale of
securities.260 The Exchange Act was amended to include section 15(c)(l),
giving the Commission power to promulgate rules defining manipulative,
deceptive, or other fraudulent devices or contrivances used by brokers or
dealers in the purchase or sale of any security other than on a national
securities exchange.27 0 Pursuant to this authority, the Commission adopted
Rule 15cl-2, which incorporated the basic language found in section 17(a)
of the Securities Act.271 Sections 15(c)(l) and IO(b) are virtually identical in
that both apply to the purchase or sale of securities. Section 15(c)(l), however, is limited to over-the-counter activities by brokers and dealers, while
section IO(b) extends both to markets and to "any person." 272
It is within this statutory framework that the Commission and the courts
have acted to protect the investing public from fraudulent selling prac2ois 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). Ashby, Federal Regulation of Securities Sales, 22 ILL. L.
REY. 635 (1928).
260 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958).
267 Ibid.
268 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
260 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
270 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1958).
271 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949).
272 For a discussion of the history of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
acts, see generally Loss 1421-30.
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tices. 273 Perhaps the most successful, and certainly the most pervasive, implementation of these provisions has been the imposition of the so-called
"shingle theory," which provides a standard of fair dealing unique in a
field comprised essentially of merchandising. Under this theory, a licensed
broker-dealer, in doing business with the public, is said to "hang out his
shingle" and thereby represent that he has expertise in the intricate business
of investment, and that the standards of his calling proscribe unfair dealing
with less well-informed customers, even in transactions where technically
the broker-dealer is dealing at arm's length. 274 This standard was first propounded in Duker & Duker,275 where the Commission held that a brokerdealer allegedly acting as a principal willfully violated section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and section 15(c)(l) of the Exchange Act by charging prices
"clearly excessive and unreasonable" in light of the current market prices.
The Commission stated that "inherent in the relationship between a dealer
and his customer is the vital representation that the customer will be dealt
with fairly and in accordance with the standards of the profession."276 Although there was no evidence adducible from the Commission's opinion as
to what the "standards of the profession" were, nor as to what constituted
an "excessive spread" between current market and the price charged to the
customer,277 it was clear that the Commission had not relied upon traditional concepts of fraud, nor upon an agency relationship to provide the
basis for the violation. However, reliance by the customers on their relationship with the dealer was emphasized as a factor to be weighed in determining the dealer's legal responsibility. In 1943 the shingle theory received
unqualified judicial affirmation in Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC.278 Although
the opinion of the Second Circuit in the Hughes case did not delineate the
exact principles of law approved, the Commission has frequently utilized
the holding of the case in proceedings against broker-dealers and their
employees.2 79 The fraudulent conduct in Hughes involved the common
pattern of reliance and riskless trading, with the dealer held to have charged
prices not bearing a reasonable relation to the current market price of the
securities. However, the court went further than in preceding cases and
suggested that reliance upon the dealer-customer relationship was not an
element of a violation of the standard of fair dealing.280
273 As Rule 15cl-2 suggests, fraudulent selling practices are not limited to conduct
adverse to the public, but may also be perpetrated against brokers and dealers by members of the public and by other persons in the securities business itself. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15cl-2 (1949).
274 See text accompanying note 262 supra.
275 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
276 Id. at 388. For a discussion of the early history of the standard of fair dealing,
see Lesh, supra note 260, at 1237.
277 The Commission avoided the definitional problem by finding the spread clearly
excessive and unreasonable.
278 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
270 See cases cited note 285 infra.
2so For subsequent judicial affirmation that reliance is not material to a breach of the
implied duty of fair dealing, see Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Hughes v.
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During the same period the Commission adopted an alternate solution
to the problem of investor protection. The Commission revoked the registration of a broker-dealer which operated by securing the confidence of a
customer-typically a widow uninitiated in securities investments who
would turn over her savings for investment and reinvestment-and then
charging prices marked-up 40 to 193 percent over the current market.281
In finding this conduct to be a willful violation of section 15(c)(l) of the
Exchange Act, the Commission relied on the theory that an agency relationship had been created between the securities firm and each customer by
oral representations and other confidences implying trust, despite the firm's
protestations that confirmations had been couched in the "sold to you"
form. 282 This finding of an implied agency was related directly to the issue
of fraud, since a failure to disclose material facts, particularly the amount
of secret profits, is a violation of the fiduciary duty.2 83
The Commission thus has alternative standards by which to judge selling practices: a shingle theory including an implied representation of fair
dealing, and a fiduciary duty resulting from an implied agency. While the
effect of the latter is to superimpose on the securities acts common-law
duties inherent in an agency relationship,284 the shingle theory imposes no
defined duties the breach of which constitutes fraud. Therefore, subsequent
Commission proceedings where violations of the standard of fair dealing
have been found have constituted efforts to define at least part of that duty
"inherent in the relationship between a broker or dealer and his customer."
As suggested by the Duker and Hughes cases, it is a fraudulent practice
for a broker-dealer to charge a price not bearing a reasonable relationship
to the current market price without disclosing the extent of his profit.285
The execution of unauthorized transactions286 and the selling of securities
at a market price materially affected by the seller287 have also been held
fraudulent. The latter proposition is based on the theory that quotation of
a price to a customer is an implied representation that such price bears a
reasonable relationship to the price prevailing in a free and open market.
SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Del. 1951).
Allender Co., Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043 (1941).
See note 254 supra.
An agent is subject to a fiduciary duty which may include a duty of full disclosure,
and the mere failure to make such disclosure, if required, constitutes fraud. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 23, 24, 389 comment b, § 390 (1958); REsrATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs
§§ 471, 472 (1932); REsrATEMENT, REsrmmON § 8 (1937); REs'I'ATEMENT, TORTS § 551
(1938).
284 Cf. Lesh, supra note 260, at 1274-75.
285 See, e.g., George Wales Allen, 39 S.E.C. 297 (1959); Paul Carroll Ferguson, 39
S.E.C. 260 (1959); William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900 (1959); Indiana State
Securities Corp., 38 S.E.C. 118 (1957); E. H. Rollins, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945); Scott
McIntyre & Co., 11 S.E.C. 442 (1942). This implied representation has been held to apply
to exchanges of securities as well as sales for cash. Jack Goldberg, 10 S.E.C. 975 (1942).
286 First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299 (1952).
287 See, e.g., Sterling Securities Corp., 39 S.E.C. 487 (1959); Daniel & Co., 38 S.E.C.
9 (1957).
281
282
283
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Thus, in the sale of an over-the-counter security where the selling brokerdealer dominates the market in that security, disclosure of the latter fact is
required. Likewise, the doing of business by a broker-dealer is an implied
representation of his solvency, and a failure to disclose insolvency is fraudulent in that such conduct violates the standards of the profession.288 Recently, the shingle theory has been applied to "boiler room" salesmen.28 0
Reliance by a broker-dealer upon fraudulent sales literature for information
to be disseminated to customers may constitute breach of the affirmative
duty to investigate the accuracy of information presented to the investing
public.290
One of the most significant areas in which the Commission has employed
the shingle theory is that of misrepresentations or omissions. While commonlaw actions for deceit require proof of scienter and reliance, as well as misrepresentation of a present material fact, 291 the Commission has taken the
position that, under the standard of fair dealing, the scope of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act and sections IO(b) and 15(c)(l) of the Exchange Act
is not so limited.292 Frequently, representations such as the following are
held to be fraudulent: "you will double your money in six months," 298 or
"the return of the purchase price is insured." 294 The position of the Commission with regard to such statements is that "the antifraud provisions of
the securities acts . . . contemplate at the very least, that recommendations
of a security made to proposed purchasers shall have a reasonable basis
and . . . they shall be accompanied by disclosure of known or easily ascertainable facts bearing upon the justification for the representations." 295
Avoidance of fraudulent misrepresentation in the sale of securities requires
reasonable and adequate inquiry into all the material facts bearing upon
the representation, accompanied by disclosure of such facts. 296 Thus, while
those misrepresentations which constituted fraudulent selling practices
under the common law remain so, the Commission has imposed an addiSee, e.g., Gill-Harkness&: Co., 38 S.E.C. 646 (1958); Cobb &: Co., 38 S.E.C. 166 (1958).
For a discussion of boiler room sales practices and proposed Commission controls,
see Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963).
290 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
291 But cf. Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544, 546 (2d
Cir. 1926); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven&: Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(1931).
292 For a comparison of the common-law action for deceit with securities fraud concepts, see 3 Loss 1430-44.
298 D. F. Bemheimer &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000, Jan. 23,
1963.
294 Ronald I. Gershen, 39 S.E.C. 874 (1960).
295 Best Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960.
See also Ross Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7069, April 30,
1963; Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, Feb.
11, 1963; B. Fennekohl &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898, Sept. 18,
1962; Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962,
afj'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963).
296 See, e.g., Alexander Reid &:. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727,
Feb. 8, 1962.
2ss
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tional duty of investigation, for failure of the securities salesman to acquaint
himself with-and subsequently to disclose-the status of the security he
is selling constitutes fraud. "Puffing," or seller's talk, an element of merchandising recognized and accepted under the common-law doctrine of caveat
emptor, has been declared specifically inapplicable to securities sales.297
Moreover, attempts to avoid this requirement of adequate basis and disclosure by couching the representation in terms of opinion have been held
to violate the obligation of fair dealing, thereby subjecting the seller to the
sanctions of the securities acts.298 Nor will the seller be protected by a fortuitous rise in price if there was no adequate basis for predicting a price
increase at the time of the sale.299 However, in this area, as in others where
specific types of conduct have been held contrary to the basic obligation of
fair dealing borne by those engaged in the sale of securities, the Commission has not explicity defined maximum limits or the scope of the requirement, but rather has conditioned its findings on such analysis as this:
"none of the information available •.. provided a basis for [the] unrestrained prediction."soo
An omission violates the antifraud provisions of the securities acts301 if
such omission is of a material fact and such fact is necessary in order to
make the statement rendered, in light of the circumstances under which it
is made, not misleading. The prohibition against omission has obvious
application to sales literature presenting a false picture of the future growth
of a business. In fact, however, the literature seldom makes any real predictions; rather, it relies upon an implied impression of potential success.
Consequently, an omission can rarely be said to make any statement misleading. On the other hand, where a business is, in fact, insolvent, omission
has been found fraudulent when accompanied by such statements as "no
risk" and "no chance of loss." 302 However, since the gravamen of the
fraudulent conduct is failure to disclose the insolvency, it would appear
that the result of such a finding could be as easily reached by applying the
more recent "adequate basis" test. The shingle theory can be said to have
imposed much the same duty in the area of fraudulent omission as in the
207 Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943); cf. B. Fennekohl & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898, Sept. 18, 1962.
208 See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Ross Securities, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7069, April 30, 1963.
209 See Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020,
Feb. 11, 1963.
800 Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962,
aff'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). But cf. Alexander Reid & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, Feb. 8, 1962, where the Commission stated
that prediction of a specific price increase of a speculative and promotional security is a
"hallmark of fraud."
801 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rules IOb and 15(c)(l) under the Exchange
Act.
802 See SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939). For other cases in•
volving fraud by omission see Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1939); Schamber
v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960).
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area of representations; in either case the violation is a failure to disclose,
interpreted against the broad standard of fair dealing.
Since in each of the above enumerated situations fraudulent conduct
was found because the seller failed in a duty defined as "fair dealing," the
finding of an implied agency used to provide a duty standard is little more
than an application of the shingle theory in slightly different terms. Under
the shingle theory, implication of a representation of fair dealing provides
a flexible standard whereby the Commission has considerable discretion in
determining what constitutes fair dealing; under the implied agency rationale, the flexibility is provided in defining what conduct between the parties
vests the salesman with an agent's fiduciary duty. Thus the legal consequences are almost always the same.303 Nevertheless, the Commission has
frequently proceeded on the theory that, where a broker-dealer, ostensibly
dealing at arm's length, generates a relationship of complete trust and confidence with his customer, an implied agency is created.3 04 It has been
stated that the intent of the parties controls the creation of an agency relationship. 3015 Nevertheless, in Hughes v. SEC,806 where an agreement had
been entered into with all customers that transactions were to be effected
by the broker-dealer as principal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the Commission's contention that a fiduciary duty existed, and held that since there had not been full disclosure of the difference
between prices charged and current market price, the conduct was fraudulent. The court dismissed the written agreement as ineffectual because most
customers could not understand its legal effect.
An implied general fiduciary duty has also been successfully utilized to
curb "chuming"-excessive trading of a customer's securities account to
increase the broker-dealer's profits.307 If the account is discretionary, i.e.,
under power of attorney the broker-dealer may purchase or sell at his
discretion, overtrading is specifically proscribed by the rules promulgated
pursuant to the Exchange Act. 308 However, where no formal discretion is
granted and the relationship is presumably that of a dealer-customer, it
303 But see Lesh, supra note 260, at 1253, where it is pointed out that in determining
whether prices charged by the broker-dealer are unrelated to current market price, if the
Commission proceeds on a shingle theory reasonable profits are non-fraudulent, while an
agent or fiduciary is liable for even small secret profits.
804 See, e.g., Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960); Lawrence R. Leeby, 13 S.E.C. 499
(1943); William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601 (1942); J. Logan &: Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 6848, July 9, 1962. See also note 281 supra and accompanying
text. For a list of suggested factors which may create this agency relationship, see Lesh,
supra note 260, at 1269-74.
805 Allender Co., Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053 (1941).
806 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). This case concerned Arleen W. Hughes, doing
business as E. W. Hughes & Co., not to be confused with the Charles Hughes case, cited
note 278 supra.
807 See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg, 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946), afj'd sub nom. Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); E. H. Rollins, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945).
308 Rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1949). The self-regulatory agencies have
similar prohibitions: NYSE rules 408, 'if 2408, at 3702; 435, 'if 2435, at 3775; NASD Rules
of Fair Practice, art. III, § 15(a).
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could be contended that no amount of trading is excessive, since each transaction is theoretically conditioned upon customer approval. 3 0 9 However, any
situation in which a firm has such control over an account that it may
engage in churning seems an appropriate case for the implication of an
agency relationship, since the extent of control exercised suggests that a
high degree of trust and confidence has been placed in the seller. The Commission has found such conduct to be a clear violation of fiduciary duty.
The similarity between the alternative standards imposed by the shingle
theory and an implied agency is obvious. Since most selling violations involve several types of fraudulent practice, assimilation of the theories
seemed a logical approach to the solution of investor protection. This the
Commission proceeded to do. For example, in Herbert R. May & Russell
H. Phinney 810 the Commission held that, since the requisite relationship of
trust and confidence was present, the charging of prices greatly in excess of
the market price was a violation of the anti-fraud provisions under either
theory. As a principal, the dealer failed in his duty of fair dealing by not
disclosing the market price; as an agent, he failed to divulge his profits in
breach of trust. This juxtaposition suggests at least one conclusion: whatever the statutory prohibitions against certain selling practices, the laws
governing the fraudulent sale of securities are today imbued with a standard of affirmative duty, whether this duty is based on an implied representation of fair dealing, or on an implied agency.
While it has been suggested that much of the Commission's policy
should be characterized as an emerging "know your merchandise" rule,311
this description embodies only half the duty imposed, in that a vital element
of this obligation is a full disclosure of whatever facts are necessary to
equalize the bargaining power of the parties. Although such fraudulent
practices as churning and the charging of prices unrelated to the current
market are not entirely disclosure violations, the decision to hold them
fraudulent is based on the assumption that the customer might not have
assented to the transaction had he gained full information concerning
relevant market price or the amount and effect of the trading.312 The Commission has reasoned that investor protection is best provided by apprising
the customer of material facts so that a decision to buy, sell, or trade may
be informed and well-considered.
However, to say that an industry geared to merchandising must deal
fairly, whether at arm's length or in confidence, does not provide definite
substantive limits within which a firm must confine its selling practices.
Cf. J. I:ogan & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6848, July 9, 1962.
27 S.E.C. 814 (1948).
See Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, Feb.
8, 1962; Cary, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 856 (1963).
812 See cases cited note 307 supra. The requirement is well-advised, since firms have
been willing to tell customers that, because they were acting at arm's length, a profit of
40% was not too high, and have even told the Commission that the "sky is the limit"
for profits in an over-the-counter transaction. Allender Co., Inc., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1056 (1941).
809
810
811
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What constitutes an excessive spread between the price charged a customer
and the current market? What information must be disclosed? How much
information, and of what kind, provides an adequate basis for predictions?
When does frequent trading become churning? What course of dealing
generates an agency relationship? These and similar questions318 continue
to plague those involved in the securities business. The Commission's policy
is one of ad hoc determination of violation, and thus after-the-fact definition
of duty; this is made necessary by the complexity of the securities business.
The intricate nature of securities merchandising and the myriad abuses to
which it is subject prompted regulation initially, and this same complexity
prevents definitive legislation and precise judicial treatment. These unanswered questions are of degree, not of kind, and answers, for the most
part, will be limited to specific fact situations. Nevertheless, Commission
decisions and judicial affirmation thereof suggest partial guidelines. Moreover, recognizing that the imposition of an affirmative duty creates problems
of vagueness and uncertainty, the Commission is at present promoting solutions to alleviate some of the harshness inherent in after-the-fact definition.
One such procedure is the official release, calling to the attention of the
industry certain negative features of a particular security.814 Dissemination
of such information charges a dealer with knowledge that failure to disclose
at least the information contained in the release is violative of fair dealing
standards. Direction by release is perhaps better suited to control of selling
practices than is either the exercise of the formal rule-making power, necessarily broadly couched, or case-by-case adjudication with its inherent uncertainty.815 The release can provide antecedent examples of cases where
disclosure of certain types of facts was thought to be essential, and a series
of such releases would indicate concepts of duty in much the same manner
as case decisions, while avoiding objections of after-the-fact vagueness. A
second procedure is the expansion of the types of sanctions which may be
imposed by the Commission. Under present law, the Commission has available only the sanction of denial or revocation of broker-dealer registration.816 An amendment to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, proposed by
the SEC, would vest the Commission with discretion, in lieu of revocation
of registration, to impose the lesser sanctions of suspension of registration
for twelve months or less, or formal censure.817 Availability of these additional sanctions would provide more flexible powers, so that the Commission could invoke measures appropriate for dealing with particular kinds
818 Cf. Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8,
1961, where Rule l0b-5 was applied to require a duty of full disclosure by the corporate
insider, although the imposition of the duty created conflicts with other obligations inherent in such a position. See generally Cary, supra note 311; 75 HARv. L. REv. 1449
(1962): 60 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1962).
814 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6525, April
12, 1961.
815 See generally Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963).
816 See note 333 infra and accompanying text.
817 S. 1642, H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b) (1963).
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or degrees of misconduct, rather than being limited to a choice between no
sanction or an excessive or inappropriate one.318
Another significant development in the rules governing the sale of
securities presents a departure from past policy of the Commission and the
self-regulatory associations; it also appears to pose many additional problems. This is the emergence of a so-called "suitability" rule. Article III,
section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides as follows:
"In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that
the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the
facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings
and as to his financial situation and needs." 319
In several cases in review of NASD action pursuant to this suitability
rule, 820 the Commission has upheld NASD action, rejecting a contention
that the suitability standard, because of vagueness, violates the nature
and cause of accusation clause of the sixth amendment.321 The securities
acts do not contain any provision requiring suitability, nor has the Commission adopted such a rule under the acts. However, as indicated by the
Special Study,822 recent boiler-room cases have suggested that lack of suitability of a security recommended for purchase by a customer, in light of his
particular financial situation and objectives, is a factor to be considered in
determining whether a broker-dealer has fulfilled his obligation to treat
his customers fairly. 323 In other words, it appears that the Commission has
itself interjected a standard of suitability as one aspect of the duty of fair
dealing, regardless of whether the NASD has moved against the brokerdealer under its Rules of Fair Practice. Although there are few cases to date
wherein the Commission has suggested that the dealer must not only "know
his merchandise," but also inquire into the needs and investment objectives
of his customer and accommodate one to the other, the Special Study
specifically recommended that "greater emphasis should be given by the
Commission . . . to the concept of 'suitability.' " 324 This recommendation
was endorsed by the Commission.325 The possibility of increased attention
See Special Study pt. 1, at 188.
Although the NYSE has no "suitability" rule as such which compares to the
NASD rule, it does have a "know your customer" requirement in Rule 405(1). This
rule was primarily designed to protect member firms against irresponsible customers, and
has generally been restricted to such use. Id. at 158.
820 Philips &: Co., 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956); First Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6497, March 20, 1961; Boren&: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 6367, Sept. 19, 1960; Gerald M. Greenberg, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6320, July 21, 1960.
821 Boren &: Co., supra note 321.
822 special Study pt. 1, at 238.
828 Mac Robbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962,
afl'd sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Best Securities, Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6282, June 3, 1960.
824 special Study pt. 1, at 329.
825 Letter from Chairman William L. Cary to Oren Harris, Chairman, Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, House of Representatives, April 5, 1963.
818
819
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to the suitability requirement poses certain questions, most of which concern the scope of the rule. While a suitability rule is subject to the same
objections of indefiniteness as are other postulations of duty, these objections
may be answered in the same way as with other rules.326 If the suitability
rule is no more than a corollary of the duty arising under an implied
agency through a confidential and discretionary course of dealing, it is
simply another element tending to show fraud. 327 On the other hand, if the
rule is applied as a requirement in all, or even most situations, it presents
a distinct departure from previous policy. Congressional and Commission
regulation has been consistent with the free enterprise system in that the
duty of fair dealing is a standard attending the bargaining process but not
affecting the consummated terms of the transaction itself. Disclosure and
investigation incident to such disclosure are calculated to provide enough
information that even the neophyte investor has a basis for determining
the suitability of a security in light of his own financial situation.328 However, broad application of a requirement that the dealer perform a suitability evaluation is an interference with the terms of the transaction and
goes considerably further than simple elimination of arm's-length dealing
between broker-dealer and customer. In addition, if the standards of suitability are "reasonableness" and "good faith," as they presumably would
be, determination of suitability would be merely an after-the-fact substitution of the Commission's value judgment for that of the dealer. While
heretofore the Commission has made such judgments, examination has
been confined to readily ascertainable dealer conduct, such as churning,
misrepresentation, or excessive price mark-ups. A judgment as to suitability
necessarily includes inquiry into the speculative matter of customer needs
and purposes, as well as the relative merits of the securities involved in
the transaction. Since this valuation is one which the Commission has
specifically avoided, and wisely so, in the past,329 a rule combining such a
determination with additional speculative elements is even less desirable.
Significantly, however, the suitability requirement has been limited to
situations where several other clear violations of the anti-fraud provisions
were present,sso or where high pressure sales techniques were used. 831 Thus,
it may well be that the suitability rule will be limited to cases involving
multiple frauds and peripheral areas involving a composite of selling prac326
327

Cf. text accompanying note 313 supra.
Cf. First Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6497, March

20, 1961.
328 In D. F. Bemheimer & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000, Jan.
22, 1963, the Commission cited three recent cases for the proposition that it is inconsistent
with principles of fair dealing and violative of the securities laws to fail to disclose known
or reasonably available information necessary to provide the investor with a fair picture
of the security being offered.
329 See Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 11, 15,
July 11, 1962.
830 Cases cited note 320 supra.
831 Cases cited note 323 supra.
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tices contrary to the obligation of fair dealing, but where evidence of
specific violations is difficult to obtain.

B. Securities and Exchange Commission Sanctions
After looking at what practices are deemed fraudulent under the federal
securities acts, the various sanctions which may be imposed by the Commission on a seller who has violated these provisions should be examined.
First, at the Commission level, a registered broker-dealer who engages in
fraudulent practices in violation of the securities acts may find himself
subject to several possible sanctions. The Commission may bring a civil
proceeding in a federal court enjoining the broker or dealer from engaging
in further fraudulent activities,332 and the federal court may issue a temporary or permanent injunction which may later serve as the basis for revocation of registration, provided the revocation is in the public interest.
Through its own administrative procedures, the Commission may revoke
the broker-dealer registration.833 The effect of such a revocation is to remove the broker-dealer, its proprietors, and any salesmen who are found
to be a cause of the revocation, from the securities business until permission
for re-entry may be obtained. The only way the Commission can proceed
against an individual salesman is through an action against the brokerdealer, and this is rather harsh where only one saleman in a large firm is
guilty of violations. During the pendency of the revocation proceedings,
the Commission may temporarily suspend the registration for the protection
of investors.834 Finally, in situations of extreme abuse and fraud, the Commission may transmit evidence to the United States Attorney General, who
may at his discretion bring a criminal action against the offenders.335 The
Commission has observed that criminal proceedings are more effective than
administrative sanctions in combating boiler-room activities. 336 During the
years 1959 and 1960, the Commission referred an average of forty-six cases
per year to the Attorney General,337 and in the fiscal year ending June 30,
1961, 126 convictions were obtained in forty-five cases.338 Certainly the
criminal sanction is a very powerful deterrent in the fraud area, and continued referrals and vigorous prosecution are desirable.
C. Self-Regulatory Agency Sanctions

A broker or dealer may also be subject to sanctions imposed by one
or more of the several self-regulatory bodies existing in the securities in48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958).
48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 780-b (1958). The Commission may also expel or
suspend from a national securities exchange any member who has violated a provision
of the Exchange Act. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(3) (1958). A similar provision
exists with regard to the NASD. 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(1)(2) (1958).
334 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 780-b (1958).
885 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1958).
836 25 SEC ANN. REP. 3 (1959).
837 27 SEC ANN. REP. 259 (table 26) (1961).
838 Id. at 165.
332
833
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dustry. First, the NASD, which polices the over-the-counter market, is required by the Exchange Act to pass rules designed to prevent fraudulent
practices.839 Pursuant to this provision the NASD has passed rules of fair
practice. The basic philosophy of these rules is that "A member, in the
conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade." 840 Also, specific rules make the
following practices violations of the rules of fair practice: unreasonable
mark-ups,841 excessive transactions in a discretionary situation,842 and the
recommending of unsuitable securities.848 Upon a finding of a violation of
the rules of fair practice, the NASD has certain sanctions available.8H
Those broker-dealers who are members of the New York Stock Exchange
are subject to specific NYSE sanctions for fraudulent selling practices. The
Exchange Act requires that the rules of the Exchange, like those of the
NASD, provide for expulsion, suspension, or discipline for violations of
"just and equitable principles of trade." 845 The constitution of the Exchange provides for sanctions against any member or allied member who is
adjudged guilty of "fraud or of fraudulent acts," 846 or willful violation of
the Exchange Act.847 The Board of Governors of the Exchange has also
adopted rules governing conduct of members and employees in their selling
activities. 848 Violation of these rules subjects a member to certain sanctions.
However, few disciplinary proceedings concerning selling practices are
instituted by the Exchange, and the value of this potential sanction is at
present subject to considerable doubt. 349 The other national exchanges have
similar anti-fraud provisions, but enforcement there is of even less significance because either the volume of sales is so low as to have little impact
on the industry, or the detection procedures are very poor.siso
D. Investor Remedies
In addition to the various disciplinary actions which may be brought by
the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies, a broker or dealer may
also be subjected to certain sanctions available to the investor. The securities acts explicity state that the remedies therein exist in addition "to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."851
Thus, a common-law deceit action is available, and a defrauded investor
52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 70o-3(b)(7) (1958).
NASD, Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 1.
Id. § 4; see Nat'! Ass'n of Security Dealers, Inc., 17 S.E.C. 459 (1944).
842 NASD, Rules of Fair Practice art. m, § 15(a).
848 Id.§ 2.
844 Id. art. V.
S41S 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1958).
846 NYSE Constitution art. XIV, § 1.
847 NYSE Constitution art. XIV, § 7.
848 NYSE Rule 401 ,I 2401, at 3695.
849 Special Study pt. 1, at 320.
81SO Id. pt. 1, at 321-22.
81Sl 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958); 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(bb)
(1958).
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may retain the stock and sue for damages.852 However, because of the scienter requirement, this remedy, in most jurisdictions, is not as favorable as
the civil liabilities created by the securities acts.853 The investor may instead
decide to return the stock and rescind the contract, receiving back his consideration.354 Rescission is generally available where there has been misrepresentation of a material fact relied upon by the purchaser, but this remedy
is fraught with difficulties, such as the requirement at law of tender of the
stock to the seller before the suit is brought.355 While a successful damage
action will usually give the investor his loss-of-bargain remedy, 356 rescission
allows the investor to recover only his purchase money. An investor might
also seek to pursue a breach of warranty action.857 In fact, under the Uniform Commercial Code, there is a built-in suitability requirement in the
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.358 The problem is that
investment securities are not "goods" as defined by the Code,859 and the
warranty provision applies only to goods. However, the warranty provision
might be applied by analogy to securities, as is suggested in a drafter's comment.860 The uncertainty of this remedy, however, makes it of doubtful
value. In addition to the common-law remedies, a defrauded investor may
also have a statutory cause of action under the applicable Blue Sky law.861
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides for civil liability in the case
of any person who sells a security making an untrue statement of a material
fact or who omits to state a material fact without being able to show that he
was not at fault in making or failing to make the statement.862 This section
has its drawbacks because it is available only against the seller, and not
against others who may have induced the investor to buy. Also, the seller
may avoid liability by showing that he did not know and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or the omission. The
statute of limitations is short and no recovery for attorney's fees is allowed.
Finally, the out-of-pocket damage measure is used, while in a fraud action
852

See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Acts, 43 YALE L.J. 227

(19!!!!).

853 Scienter is an element of common-law deceit, but it is generally conceded that no
such requirement exists under the civil liabilities imposed by the securities acts. See
REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 526 (1934). On the absence of a scienter requirement under the
federal civil liability provisions, see Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis.
1962).
854. See Shulman, supra note 352, at 231.
855 See E.T.C. Corp. v. Title Guar. &: Trust Co., 271 N.Y. 124, 2 N.E.2d 284, 286 (1936).
856 The majority of courts grant loss-of-bargain damages in a deceit action, while a
minority confine damages to out-of-pocket losses. See PROSSER, TORTS 568, 571 (2d ed. 1955).
857 See Shulman, supra note 352, at 228.
858 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
859 For the definition of "goods," see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(1).
800 The comment follows § 2-105(1) and cites Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E.
479 (1934), as authority for applying the warranty provision by analogy to securities.
861 See 3 Loss 1631, 1682.
862 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958). See generally Latty, The Aggrieved
Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes,
18 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (195!!).
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at common law the measure of damages is usually based on the loss-of•
bargain rule.363
The Exchange Act includes no provision for civil liability comparable
to section 12(2) of the Securities Act. However, Rule IOb-5, enacted pursuant
to section IO of the ~xchange Act, has been interpreted by the courts as
giving rise to an implied civil liability for violation of its antifraud provisions. Because the securities acts provide for several express civil liabilities, it is difficult to infer the legislative intent necessary to imply a civil
liability where none exists in the express language of the statute. Nevertheless, since the defrauded seller was not protected by the securities acts, an
implied cause of action was thought desirable by the courts.364 The Supreme
Court has declined to hear cases questioning the propriety of this implied
liability, and it now seems clear that implied civil liability under Rule
IOb-5 has complete judicial acceptance.
The elements necessary to support a IOb-5 action are: (1) violation of
IOb-5 in connection with either the sale or purchase of a security and (2)
the direct or indirect use of interstate commerce, the mails, or a national
securities exchange in connection with the sale or purchase.365 It is generally
conceded that recovery under IOb-5 is broader than a common-law deceit
action, but to what extent depends upon the jurisdiction. The element of
scienter is not necessary for a I0b-5 action, but in those states with a broad
disclosure duty in deceit actions IOb-5 may merely be a codification of the
common law. 366 The element of reliance, necessary in deceit, has also been
held to be an indispensable element of a IOb-5 action,367 but there is
authority to the contrary.3 68
An interesting aspect of the implied civil liability embodied in IOb-5
is that, since this rule applies to "any person," it has been used to remedy
misuse of corporate insider information. In the landmark case of Cady,
Roberts & Co.369 an obligation was imposed on insiders not to take advantage of nonpublic information disclosed for a corporate purpose. This
seems far removed from fraud in the ordinary sale of securities, but arguably
necessary because few jurisdictions require corporate insiders to disclose
confidential information when dealing with existing shareholders.870 Recent judicial developments extending the scope of IOb-5 in connection with
corporate insiders and dominant shareholders give reason to believe that
363
864
365

E.g., Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959).

See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
See generally White, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Swindlers and the
Securities Acts, 45 A.B.A.J. 129 (1959).
366 See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 60 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
867 See Reed v. Riddle Airline, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
208 F. Supp. 808 (En. Wis. 1962); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
368 See Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
369 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 76803 (S.E.C. Nov. 8, 1961).
370 See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 80 (rev. ed. 1946); Annot., 84 A.L.R.
615 (1933).
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the role of this rule as a remedy in the corporate setting will be extended.371
Another problem existing under IOb-5 is that there is no federal statute
of limitations applicable, and the courts have utilized the statute of limitations applicable to fraud actions of the state in which the federal court is
sitting.372 This gives rise to lack of uniformity from state to state, although
the cause of action is federal. Also, since the courts have been willing to
apply IOb-5 civil liability to both buyers and sellers,373 this means that the
restrictions which exist under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, applicable
to a suit by a defrauded purchaser, are rendered nugatory because IOb-5
encompasses all possible section 12(2) causes of action. The result is that
the courts, in order to give a defrauded seller a federal cause of action, have
by judicial legislation made section 12(2) of negligible importance.
As a final remedy, the federal courts are empowered under the securities
acts to grant ancillary relief, such as temporary injunctions.374 Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act sets up certain legal consequences, but does not restrict
the procedure or form of action the claimant must use. While it appears
that the securities acts provide the defrauded investor with comprehensive
relief, it is interesting to note that investors have made relatively infrequent
use of the remedies provided by the federal securities acts. 375
E. Special Study Findings and Recommendations
The Special Study devoted considerable attention to selling practices.376
After a thorough study of the present law, the evolution of the Commission's theories of fraudulent practices, detection problems, and the role of
the self-regulatory agencies, the Study concluded that "some segments of
the industry appear to be earnestly promoting high standards of selling
while others seem only to be earnestly promoting sales."377 It was also made
clear that no quantitative measurement of the extent of fraudulent practices
was intended, but these practices were found to exist throughout the industry, from the boiler-rooms to the well-known brokerage firms. 378
The Special Study made several specific recommendations. It urged that
the large broker-dealer firms strengthen supervision of the selling activities
of their personnel by greater use of electronic data processing equipment
programmed to expose overtrading and other fraudulent practices. The
basis of this recommendation was that even in the responsible firms indis11 See Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), wherein a
corporation succeeded in a cause of action against a corporate insider for fraudulently
inducing the corporation to issue stock for worthless consideration even though questions
of corporate mismanagement were involved. See 62 M1cH. L. REv. 339 (1963). See also
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), wherein failure of a
dominant shareholder to disclose the reason for a change in the market price of the
corporation's stock was held actionable under lOb-5.
372 See Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
873 See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
374 See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
375 See 3 Loss 1685.
876 See generally Special Study pt. 1, at 237-330.
377 Id. at 323.
878 Id. at 325.
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vidual salesmen engage in fraudulent practices; thus closer supervmon
aided by electronic data processing would be valuable in detecting and
curbing abuses. It was also recommended that the self-regulatory agencies
strengthen their enforcement procedures and assure more effective supervision of firm selling practices. The NASD already has rules covering the major
selling abuses, but detection of violations could be greatly improved. Likewise, the NYSE has rules governing fraudulent selling practices, but the
limited number of disciplinary proceedings instituted suggested to the
Study either a failure in the detection program or a reluctance to acknowledge selling abuses as a matter of concern. The self-regulatory agencies
could play a key role in curbing fraudulent selling practices, and every attempt should be made to encourage this. To supplement these measures
relating to control by firms and self-regulatory agencies, the Special Study
suggested that the Commission pass rules requiring additional record-keeping to facilitate discovery of abusive selling practices.3 79 Furthermore, it was
recommended that the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies give
more emphasis to suitability by promulgating statements of policy further
elucidating what the concept means. The authors of the Report felt that
the suitability concept is important and should be fully developed. Clearly,
if suitability is to become a meaningful requirement in the securities industry, clearer standards are necessary so that the scope of this requirement
can be ascertained.
The Study further advocated that wider and more prominent use be
made of disclosures officially filed in connection with selling activities. For
example, brokers and dealers should show reports and proxy statements
to prospective customers or advise where they may be found. While some
doubt may exist as to the ability of the average investor to interpret effectively such information, it should certainly be made available. Investor
education is essential to the elimination of selling practice abuses. In order
to eliminate some of the pressure and incentive now existing for large
volume sales, it was recommended that the compensation of salesmen be
less dependent on the volume of securities sold. The commission method
of compensation may be inherent in the industry, but it encourages overtrading and the recommendation of securities on which the commission
is highest, regardless of the merit of the securities. It is not very probable
that the commission method of compensation will disappear, but implementation of this proposal would help eliminate such practices as churning and the charging of unreasonable prices.
Finally, it was urged that the sanctions available to the Commission be
expanded so that disciplinary action might be taken against one or a few
salesmen in a firm without involving the entire firm. The proposed legislation incorporates such a provision.879a Presently, to discipline one errant
salesman the Commission must discipline the whole firm-a sanction which
can be very harsh as compared with the violation.
S79 Id. at 328.
S79a S. 1642, H.R.

6789, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b) (1963).
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F. Conclusion
It is apparent that court and Commission proceedings of recent months
have instituted highly significant changes in the level of integrity required
in broker-dealer operations. Full realization of the importance of these
developments may decrease to some extent the significance of the Special
Study findings and recommendations. Nevertheless, the Study constitutes
a highly constructive analysis of selling practices generally, and certainly
deserves great attention for that reason. It is significant, however, that the
Study conclusions are aimed primarily at continuing and increased emphasis
on the traditional standards applicable to the securities industry. As
such, they simply embody specific extensions of existing policy. Essentially, that policy is one of proscribing certain conduct peculiar to the sale
of securities, primarily that which breaches concepts of fair dealing. It is
too late to deny either the necessity for securities regulation or the efficacy
of utilizing regulatory power to create a standard of professionalism
throughout the industry. Elimination of many fraudulent sales practices
could undoubtedly be accomplished by the imposition of a general duty of
disclosure to the customer, thereby equalizing bargaining power.
An expansion of the methods of detecting sales fraud through requiring
more complete records of transactions was recommended by the Special
Study. Increased qualification requirements for personnel involved in the
securities business880 and greater control over sales practices through the
use of electronic data processing were also recommended. Unquestionably,
implementation of these recommendations would serve to reduce, directly
or indirectly, the susceptibility of securities sales to fraudulent practices.
However, to increase duties of disclosure and investigation, and to widen
the scope of conduct considered fraudulent is not to eliminate the conduct.
Awareness that conduct is fraudulent and subject to sanction is not· always an effective deterrent; nor can increased supervision alone eliminate
deleterious practices. Fraud is a pervasive evil, whatever the context, and
in a merchandising industry so rapidly expanding, with burgeoning sales
posing so high a potential for fraudulent practice, many investors could
continue to be irrevocably injured. Therefore, additional deterrents should
be provided which would conform to Commission policy and at the same
time provide redress for injured investors.
First, a strictly enforced net capital requirement, possibly accompanied
by a bonding procedure, would help assure that defrauded investors could
recoup their losses; this would also help discourage fringe operations, such
as boiler-rooms, because bonding would be very expensive for this type of
establishment. Second, a simple federal remedy available to defrauded investors should be enacted by Congress. A cause of action should arise out of
any violation of the anti-fraud provisions. The provision should have a
uniform statute of limitations, and a provision allowing recovery of reasonable attorney's fees. Third, in situations where willful disregard of estab880 Sec

section I infra.
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lished standards of conduct can be shown, the defrauded investor should be
able to recover double damages. The purpose of this provision would be
analogous to the treble damage action in the antitrust area in that removal
of the economic incentive to operate fraudulently would serve as a deterrent, as well as provide relief for the investor.
Finally, more effort should be expended in the area of investor education. This could be accomplished to some degree with a publicity campaign
calculated to illustrate such practices as churning, wild and extravagant
claims of profits, and the customary unreliability of information received
from boiler-room operators. The campaign should also make more apparent
the functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the selfregulatory agencies. Alerting the public to the potential areas and methods
of fraud is a logical and necessary component of the present selling practice regulations. An informed general public would provide a deterrent to
fraud and implement present policy in several ways. It would greatly
facilitate detection of frauds through timely complaint. It would reduce
the effectiveness of high pressure sales campaigns and other sales practices
which are presently aided by the purchaser's ignorance and susceptibility
to innuendo. It would complement the full disclosure requirements now
imposed on the securities industry by creating greater equality of bargaining power. Above all, an educated public might demand the same standards
of performance of their broker-dealers as is now required by the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although it is apparent that there is room for improvement in the practices of many segments of the securities industry, the Report of the Special
Study has demonstrated that the approach of the government to regulation
of the industry should continue to be based on the same philosophy with
which federal securities regulation originated in the 1930's. It is significant
that Mr. Justice Douglas, then chairman of the Commission, indicated that
it was the intent of his agency to let self-regulation play the key regulatory
role. In his words, "Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope
that it would never have to be used." 381 This approach is certainly consistent with recognition by the Study, that the securities industry has for the
most part shown itself to be imbued with a considerable sense of public
responsibility. Chairman Cary, in speaking of a Special Study, has stated:
"[I]t is not a picture of pervasive fraudulent activity and in this respect
contrasts markedly with the hearings and findings of the early Thirties
381 Quoted in The Wall Street J., Oct. 8, 1963, p. 14, col. 4. After noting the fact that
reference to firearms has never been particularly pleasant to securities men, the Journal
also pointed out that, notwithstanding the Study's emphasis on a government-securities
industry partnership, many in the securities industry fear that the government intends to
shrink sharply the industry's role in the partnership.
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preceding the enactment of the Federal securities laws. The Study confirms the strength of those laws and the heightened sense of obligation
of the financial community."3B2
Keeping this in mind, the writers of this comment have attempted no
comprehensive coverage of the problems attending the function of the
securities industry; rather, the four topics discussed represent specific areas
of operation in which the need for reform does in fact seem clear. While
no claim is made to having devised a panacea for the problem areas dealt
with, it is submitted that the recommendations herein articulated should
be considered as solutions for the complex problems involved. Certainly, if
the level of competence of securities personnel is raised, if corporate publicity is confined to the facts of corporate life, if investment advisers assume
a fiduciary responsibility with respect to those whom they advise, and if
more effective efforts are made to eliminate undesirable selling practices,
no one can deny that strength will have been added to the securities industry and in turn to the entire economy.
Robert N. Dorosin
Ira J. Jaffe
Rolfe A. Worden
James C. Lockwood
Willoughby C. Johnson
382 Excerpt from a letter of Chairman Cary, printed in the New York Times, April
4, 1963, p. 40, col. I. (Emphasis added.)

